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In criminal cases, any fact which increases the maximum
punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule,
which comes from Apprendi v. New Jersey, looks to what facts do, not what
they are called; in Justice Scalia's memorable turn of phrase, it applies
whether the legislature has labeled operant facts "elements, enhancements,
or Mary Jane." Civil statutes, however, can expose an individual to the
same or greater deprivation of liberty on identical facts without needing to
meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. If Apprendi is,
indeed, functional, why is it limited to formally criminal cases? Why does
it not apply to all punishments, no matter whether they are called civil,
criminal, or Mary Jane?
One often-proposed answer is that Apprendi derives its holding
exclusively from the Sixth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment applies
only to "criminal prosecutions." Apprendi is not, however, just a Sixth
Amendment case. Its "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement comes
from a formally civil case, In re Winship, which itself explicitly rejected the
idea that civil labels could insulate a state from the heightened standards of
proof required under due process. Because part of Apprendi's rule comes
* This article was written with the support of the Santa Clara School of Law Faculty Fund. Many
thanks to those who read and commented on earlier versions of the article, including participants at
faculty workshops at Santa Clara, USF, and the ASU Junior Faculty Workshop, and Farah Brelvi, M.
Ryan Calo, Kyle Graham, Sebastian Kaplan, Erin Murphy, Michelle Oberman, John O'Brien, David
Sloss, and Robert Weisberg. Thanks to Jason de Barros, SCU 2012, for excellent research assistance.
This article's original title was Civil, Criminal, or Mary Jane: Stigma, Legislative Labels, and the Civil
Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure. I mention that only to say that if you've followed a citation to
that article, you're in the right place.
117
HeinOnline  -- 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 117 2010-2011
AM. J. CRIM. L.
from a civil case, I argue that Apprendi's application cannot, therefore, be
limited on formal grounds to criminal cases. To determine the limits of
Apprendi's application, one must instead return to the interests that both
Winship and Apprendi identified as worthy of protection: the imposition of
stigma and the deprivation of liberty.
This Article proposes that stigma is the substantive concern that
separates retribution from regulation, punishment from public safety.
Using sociology's modified labeling theory, I provide a substantive
definition of stigma and explore how a unified due process approach, with
stigma as one of its concerns, might provide a more meaningful way to
separate punishment from risk management. This approach would move
judicial discourse away from empty, taxonomic arguments about legislative
labels towards an examination of the effects laws have on the lives of those
subjected to them. This new direction would more accurately and
comprehensively address the values and interests at the heart of the justice
system. It would also provide some judicial oversight of so-called collateral
consequences, which use formally civil statutes to impose significant liberty
restrictions based on predicate criminal behavior. This Article examines
the specific example of civil commitments for sexually violent predators
(SVPs), but the arguments also apply to any civil restrictions placed on
offenders or ex-offenders.
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Introduction
The distinction between civil and criminal has at least one
indisputable real-world consequence: the constitutionally-guaranteed
procedural protections that attach to each. Defendants facing criminal
sanctions are granted specific procedural protections under the Constitution,
such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury in all criminal proceedings. We often
explain these particular protections by noting that when criminal defendants
have their liberty at stake, the interest in ensuring that the innocent are not
wrongly punished is at its height. The problem, however, is that civil
regulations can restrict liberty to an equal degree without the same set of
enumerated procedural protections.
The importance of this procedural distinction has grown sharper in
recent years: the procedural protections attaching to civil and criminal
penalties have grown more divergent even as the potential liberty impacts
have equalized. This is the result of two phenomena: first, the revolution in
criminal procedure following Apprendi v. New Jersey' in 2000, and second,
a series of late 1990's cases which failed to provide substantive
constitutional limits on civil commitment statutes targeting sexually violent
predators (SVPs). Apprendi held that any fact leading to an increase in the
statutory maximum punishment must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 This means that all facts justifying incarceration (or any
other type of punishment) must be proven or admitted by the highest
standard of proof. For civil laws aimed at sexual predators, which carry a
potential of life confinement, these same facts about criminal predicate
behavior need not be found beyond a reasonable doubt. A state can
incarcerate an SVP indefinitely without proving any of the relevant facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, provided the offender has been convicted of a
sex offense3 and is deemed currently dangerous. The subject matter,
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id. at 490.
3. The term sex offense is defined broadly. At least thirteen states require registration for public
urination (although two states limit the registration requirement to those who urinated in the view of a
2011] 119
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predicate facts, and consequences of a pair of civil and criminal cases could
therefore be exactly the same, but the procedures governing both could be
completely different. The way a law is labeled-civil or criminal-is
crucial for determining the level of constitutional protection. Yet if there is
something about the nature of civil and criminal penalties that justifies their
different procedural treatment, criminal and civil cases have not made that
sufficiently clear.
The issue is not simply that changing coalitions of justices have
been able to get at least five votes-individual justices themselves treat
civil and criminal deprivations as entirely distinct processes. In the
criminal justice context, Justice Scalia is adamant that labels on a given fact
do not change the constitutional analysis. A fact's impact on the amount of
time a criminal defendant serves is all that matters: "all facts essential to
imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives-whether
the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary
Jane-must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt." If a law is
civil, however, Justice Scalia no longer cares about the effects a given fact
has on liberty. Indeed, it is error to look beyond the "statute on its face" to
"the character of the actual sanctions imposed."5  Instead, "the question of
criminal penalty vel non depends upon the intent of the legislature."6 Thus,
even when a civil law results in the same deprivation of liberty-or
potentially greater deprivations of liberty-Justice Scalia is willing to defer
to the legislature, even though he holds the line in the criminal context.
The positions taken by other justices are less striking than Justice
Scalia's,7 but there is nevertheless a willingness on the part of some justices
to take the opposite position: deferring to the legislature in criminal cases
while simultaneously scrutinizing civil cases. Ultimately, despite the fact
that Apprendi has resulted in a new focus on the distinction between formal
minor), while at least twenty-nine states require registration for consensual sex between teenagers.
SARAH ToFTE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 39
(2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers. Prostitutes in New
Orleans are also charged as sex offenders, contributing to difficulties they face in finding housing and
employment. Jordan Flaherty, Her Crime? Sex Work in New Orleans, COLORLINES (Jan. 13, 2010,
12:00 PM), http://www.colorlines.com/archives/2010/01/her-crimesexworkin_new_orleans.html.
4. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 268 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
6. Id. at 269.
7. In this Article, I focus on Justice Breyer and Justices Scalia and Thomas. These three justices
wrote for different sides throughout the Apprendi line, see, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005);
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009), and in the sex
offender cases I discuss. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407 (2002); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). The other justices voted as follows: Justice
Ginsburg, who wrote the majority in Ice, joined the majority in Apprendi, Blakely, Cunningham, and
(notoriously) in Booker, and joined Justice Breyer in the sex offender cases. Justice Kennedy joined
Justice Breyer in the Apprendi cases and voted with the majority in all the sex offender cases, including
Crane. Justice Souter voted with Justices Scalia and Thomas in the Apprendi cases (including Ice) and
in Doe, but voted with Justice Breyer in Hendricks and Crane.
120 [Vol. 38:2
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and functional approaches to reading criminal statutes, none of this
conversation has extended to civil cases, nor has the Supreme Court made
any effort to reify the two approaches. After Apprendi, labels do not matter
within criminal statutes, but they serve to cordon off whole areas of state
action from Apprendi's requirements. Can it be true that labels don't
matter-unless the label in question is the word "civil," in which case
labels are almost all that matters? 8
Justice Scalia has repeatedly characterized Apprendi as a Sixth
Amendment jury right,9 and the Sixth Amendment itself specifies "criminal
prosecutions."' 0  Under this reading, then, the textual anchor in the
Constitution means that only those laws labeled criminal deserve
Apprendi's protections. The problem with this line of argument is that
Apprendi is, emphatically, not just a Sixth Amendment case:" it is "the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution" which requires that
findings of fact on which sentences are based "be proved to a jury beyond a
8. Nancy King and Susan Klein, in passing, saw the link between civil commitment laws and
Apprendi very early on. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1467, 1467-68 (2001) (comparing the role of legislative labels in determining whether a law is civil or
criminal to their role in determining whether a fact is an element or an enhancement). Their article fails
to address the unique role of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) in the Apprendi line as a civil/criminal
bridge, and they do not use stigma as a means of distinguishing between civil and criminal penalties.
William Stuntz approached the problem in a seminal article from a perspective largely concerned with
the overcriminalization of civil activity. William Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal
Line, 7 J. CONTEM. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996). Because the rules of criminal procedure "let the
government do things to criminal suspects or defendants that it can't do to civil litigants," Stuntz argued
that legislators have incentives to "broaden the scope of criminal liability." Id at 7-8. In this Article,
however, I am concerned with precisely the opposite phenomenon. Because the hard and fast rules of
criminal procedure do not apply to civil statutes, the government has every incentive to avoid the
procedural tax of criminal law and "overcivilize" criminal conduct, particularly in the case of SVP laws.
9. See, e.g., Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Apprendi's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment's jury-trial guarantee"); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing Apprendi as "the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment"). Of course, as
early as Winship, it was noted that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is not textually tied
to any provision in the constitution. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting)
("[N]owhere in [the Constitution] is there any statement that conviction of a crime requires proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Indeed, this is why I have elsewhere referred to it as the Apprendi right or the Apprendi rule,
to avoid conflating it with the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and
Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 893,
896 (2009). Nevertheless, at least one commentator argues that I unduly focused on the jury. See
Douglas A. Berman, Should Juries Be the Guide for Adventures Through Apprendi-Land?, 109 CoLtUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 65 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/65_Berman.pdf.
But because my prior article was focused on the relative roles of the jury and the parole board, spending
time discussing the institutional role of the jury made sense. It was not, however, my intention to give
short shrift to Winship due process rights and the standard of proof. Indeed, I noted in that Article that
the standard of proof part of the Apprendi rule was distinct from the jury component. See Ball, supra, at
961 ("Apprendi requires both that the jury find facts and that it find those facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. Since both of these parts of the rule involve the jury and touch on similar interests, they are often
conflated, but the requirement that facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is a distinct part of the
Apprendi rule." (internal citations omitted)).
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reasonable doubt."' 2 Apprendi's requirement that facts be found beyond a
reasonable doubt comes, ironically, from In re Winship,13 a formally civil
case which itself rejected the idea that a civil "label of convenience" could
allow a state to shirk its procedural obligations.14
Winship, a juvenile, faced a civil proceeding that would have
resulted in his confinement in a civil institution (reform school).' 5 The New
York Court of Appeals held that the formal civil label meant that Winship
didn't deserve criminal due process protections, but the Supreme Court
rejected this argument, holding that the civil label on the law was not
dispositive and that it had to look to the substance of the liberty deprivation
in question.16 In other words, Winship functionally analyzed a civil statute
in concluding that some of the protections associated with criminal
procedure applied.'7 Apprendi has since incorporated Winship into a line of
criminal cases, and Winship's holding is now such a part of criminal
procedure that this formally civil case has almost no influence in the
analysis of civil statutes.
In this Article I hope to change that. I propose that Winship's focus
on due process provides a way to unify civil and criminal approaches, to
enable us to analyze the function of a statute whether it is called civil,
criminal, or Mary Jane. The key to using Winship is its identification of
two separate interests: the imposition of stigma and the deprivation of
liberty, interests which Apprendi also identified.' 9
The flexibility of Winship's due process method accommodates the
necessary shades of gray between civil and criminal. Any other approach 20
is too binary, providing for the complete application of criminal procedure
(if a civil statute is deemed punitive) or none at all. Winship suggests that
we attach protections not to types of statute, but to types of deprivation.2 1
A formally civil law, then, might have a little, a lot, or all of the protections
of criminal procedure, but the kinds of protection and their intensity will
depend on the liberty interests involved and the degree to which they might
be infringed. Due process is better suited to the criminal/civil distinction
than a formalistic rule based on legislative labels, and it forces us to look at
the values we are protecting. This focus has an added benefit: it
12. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
13. Id. at 477 (2000) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 360.
16. Id. at 365.
17. It did so without employing the methodology developed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and used elsewhere to deem civil laws punitive. See infra Part
III.B.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77.
20. Including the Mendoza-Martinez test, which I discuss in greater detail in Part II.B, infra.
21. See infra Part II.A.
[Vol. 38:2122
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underscores the fact that Apprendi is a bundle of procedural protections
designed to protect a bundle of rights, not an all-or-nothing rule applied
mechanically after a certain threshold.
While this Article begins with an analysis of sex offender statutes,
this is not an Article about sex offender statutes per se. There are other
areas of the law where the civil/criminal divide results in different legal
consequences for similar behavior.2 2 What I intend to explore in this
Article is how these doctrinal difficulties stem from what I see as a more
fundamental tension: the ways in which morality is often used as a proxy
for risk, and risk is often used as a proxy for morality.
This Article uses Apprendi and sex offender laws as an entry point
for these discussions. My goal is to contribute both to our understanding of
Apprendi and to see the ways in which Apprendi contributes to the risk
management and retribution issues at the heart of the civil/criminal
distinction. So, while this Article, in many ways, builds off my prior article
Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and
the Meaning of Punishment,23 this Article looks at the issue of punishment
in a slightly different way: is there a substantive difference between actions
taken under the auspices of a civil statute and actions taken under the
auspices of a criminal statute?
Although I suggest ways in which the stigma and liberty interests
identified in Winship might operate in both formally civil and formally
criminal cases, this Article should not be read as a concrete policy proposal.
My main point is that we need to go beyond labels themselves to see what
interests they represent, and to go beyond a formalistic understanding of the
rules-particularly Apprendi-to see how we might more precisely match
individual procedures to individual interests. I hope to move the substance
of the discussion toward the constitutional values that Apprendi and the
Due Process Clause vindicate. At the very least, because the term stigma is
already invoked regularly throughout criminal law as a material liberty
22. As a far from exhaustive list, consider three examples. Immigrants are often detained in
prison-like conditions, or in actual prisons, but they are not granted the procedural guarantees of
criminal defendants in similar situations because immigration violations are formally civil. For an in-
depth discussion of immigration detention in the national security context, see David Cole, In Aid of
Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003 (2002). The
civil/criminal distinction is also blurred when assets used in association with drug trafficking are
forfeited civilly. The Supreme Court, in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), held that the
Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause could apply to civil forfeiture claims, but on its face this
does not mean the civil actions are criminal: the Eighth Amendment does not use the term "civil" or
"criminal", merely "punishment." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Finally, one might also consider the
civil/criminal distinction through an examination of punitive damages in civil cases. For a discussion of
punitive damages in the civil context that largely tracks my usage of functional and formal analysis, see
Lydon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework
for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1433 (1987).
23. See Ball, supra note 11 (explaining that the meaning of punishment in Apprendi forecloses the
practice of using the same set of facts to make one ineligible for parole in a parole-eligible sentence).
2011] 123
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interest-not least in the text of Apprendi itself 24-this Article. seeks to
offer an initial working definition of stigma.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part 1, 1 lay out the
limitations of formalism in both the criminal and civil context, using the
Apprendi line and a line of cases dealing with civil penalties for criminal
predicate offenses (specifically, sex offenses). I conclude that formalism is
not a coherent, administrable way to resolve the issue. In Part II, I look to a
substantive conception of the under-defined interest identified in both
Winship and Apprendi: stigma. Drawing on sociology's modified labeling
theory, I sketch out a substantive account of stigma and examine its use as
an interest in itself, showing how labels like "sexual predator" or "juvenile
delinquent" affect individuals profoundly and are therefore worthy of a
heightened standard of proof whether the law imposing them is formally
civil or criminal.25 In Part III, I analyze how due process protections might
apply to formally civil punishments. By focusing on values, not taxonomy,
a due process framework can better explain what interests are at stake and
what is needed to protect them. In Part IV, I use the discussion of stigma to
shed some light on what I call public safety punishments: nominally
criminal penalties that are designed to control risk. I show how the analysis
used in this Article can contribute to the Apprendi line by providing an
alternative reading to the otherwise inexplicable decision in the recent
Apprendi case, Oregon v. Ice.26
I. The Limits of Labeling
Within the criminal realm, Apprendi is clear: function, not form, is
all that matters. The state cannot use criminal law to deprive an individual
of his liberty without proving beyond a reasonable doubt any fact which
increases his maximum punishment,27 and legislators cannot circumvent
these constitutional limits by labeling these facts something besides
elements of crimes. A state need not worry about functional analysis,
however, if it uses a civil law to deprive an individual of these same
liberties.28 Laws that serve the same function are thus treated differently
because they are labeled differently, even when the effect of these statutes
is the same. If a law has a civil label, labels are all that matters; after a law
is labeled criminal, labels no longer matter. If the function of the law is the
24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485.
25. In Part III, I also use stigma as a means of distinguishing between liberty restrictions that
serve to punish and liberty restrictions that serve to regulate public safety. Stigmatic designations, in
this instance, are based less on particularized evidence and more on stereotypes, thereby reinforcing
values, not controlling risk.
26. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
27. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
28. See id. at 490.
[Vol. 38:2124
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same, how can so much turn on a formality? How, too, can we explain why
justices who defer to the legislature in civil cases do not defer in criminal
cases, 2 9 and vice-versa? 30
In this Part, I focus primarily on cases authorizing indefinite civil
commitment for sexually violent predators (SVPs), offenders who have
completed criminal sentences for sexual assaults who are deemed to pose,
by a preponderance of the evidence, a future danger to society. SVP laws
require criminal predicates and involve restrictions on liberty, but because
they are formally civil, they have not been held to require all of the
protections of criminal procedure.
My aim here is not to recount all the history-arguments over the
civil/criminal distinction have been going on for a long time, with lots of
twists and turns32-but to isolate individual justices' recent attitudes
towards legislative deference in the civil context and compare them to their
attitudes in the Apprendi line. That is, after Apprendi, functionalism is
dominant in criminal procedure, but its method appears to have made no
inroads in the analysis of civil cases. So, while there are similar (and
29. Compare Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 720 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If,' we said, 'a State makes
an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no
matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. "'(quoting Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002))), with Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 269-70 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The short of the matter is that, for Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clause purposes,
the question of criminal penalty vel non depends upon the intent of the legislature. . . . Only this
approach, it seems to me, is in accord with our sound and traditional reluctance to be the initial
interpreter of state law.").
30. Compare Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 329 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I agree
with the majority's analysis, but not with its conclusion . . . I agree that, classically speaking, the
difference between a traditional sentencing factor and an element of a greater offense often comes down
to a legislative choice about which label to affix. But I cannot jump from there to the conclusion that
the Sixth Amendment always requires identical treatment of the two scenarios."), with Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 381 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If these obvious similarities [between
criminal procedure and civil commitment procedures] cannot by themselves prove that Kansas' 'civil
commitment' statute is criminal, neither can the word 'civil' written into the statute . . . by itself prove
the contrary.").
31. See generally Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
32. See Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 679, 681
(1999) (noting that after the 1970's the Court increasingly accepted the civil designation at face value);
id. at 682 (observing a change from 1989 to 1994 as the Supreme Court started to look at the substance
of laws-"independent and principled distinctions between punitive and non-punitive sanctions"-in a
series of cases dealing with civil in rem forfeiture); id. at 683 (the Court "now routinely blesses
whatever label a legislature places on a sanction").
33. Part of the problem is that there is no uniform approach-no Glucksberg equivalent for the
analysis of civil statutes-although the Court often applies Mendoza-Martinez's seven factor test "[i]n
fact if not in theory." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez held that a law allowing for the
denationalization of draft dodgers violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. 372 U.S. 144, 146 (1963); see also infra at Part I.A.2 and Part II1.B (discussing the
Mendoza-Martinez test in greater detail). Much of the analysis of civil cases focuses on precedent from
cases with similar subject matter (e.g.. other civil commitment cases or cases involving mental illness).
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similarly interesting) distinctions in older cases such as Trop v. Dulles,34 1
will focus on three cases just before and after Apprendi: Kansas v.
Hendricks,35 which upheld an SVP law, Seling v. Young,36 which denied an
as-applied challenge to an SVP law, and Smith v. Doe," which upheld post-
sentence sex offender registration. In these three cases, 38 the Court grew
increasingly deferential towards the legislature, and Justices Scalia and
Thomas reversed course from their Apprendi positions and argued that the
words in a statute-not their effects-were all that mattered.39 Ultimately,
this Part aims to prove that deference to legislative labels cannot provide a
meaningful-or workable-distinction between civil and criminal, and that
there needs to be a substantive distinction between the two.
A. Civil Deference, Criminal Functionalism
Justices Scalia and Thomas take a functional approach to criminal
statutes, but if a law is civil, they defer to the legislature. I call this
approach formal functionalism: functional analysis begins only when the
formal "criminal" label has been applied. In civil SVP statutes, then, as
long as there is any possible civil effect, these justices defer to the
legislature. In criminal statutes, any possible effect on time served means
the Supreme Court cannot defer to the legislature.
1. Apprendi Functionalism
Under Apprendi, a jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts
which increase punishment, no matter in what section of a state's code they
might be found: "merely because the state legislature" deems a given fact a
sentence enhancement does not mean the fact "is not an essential element of
the offense."40 When a sentence enhancement "describe[s] an increase
beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional
34. 356 U.S. 86, 87 (1958) (holding that a law that provided for loss of citizenship following
desertion violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); see also id at
95 (legislative labels are not dispositive; "[tihe inquiry must be directed to substance.").
35. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
36. 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
37. 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003).
38. I will also look at a fourth case-Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) -when I explore the
functionalist position taken by Justice Breyer and other members of the Ice majority. See infra notes
120-130.
39. Justices Scalia and Thomas voted with the majority in the "deferential" sex offender cases, see
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350, and Doe, 538 U.S. at 89, and dissented in the "functional" case. See Crane,
534 U.S. 415. Justice Thomas wrote the Hendricks opinion and Justice Scalia wrote the Crane dissent.
40. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000). For a more extensive analysis, see Ball,
supra note I1, at 950-52, 962-63.
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equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the
jury's guilty verdict."4A Ultimately, "the relevant inquiry is one not of form,
but of effect."42
In Apprendi itself, the defendant, Charles Apprendi, pleaded guilty
to three weapons charges, two of which subjected him to a five- to ten-year
sentence, and one which subjected him to a three- to five-year sentence.43
When a judge found that Apprendi acted with racial animus, triggering a
sentence enhancement, he was sentenced to twelve years on one of the
charges." The Supreme Court held that this practice was the functional
equivalent of convicting him of an aggravated crime, which "allow[ed] a
jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense . . . [and] after a
subsequent and separate proceeding . . . allow[ed] a judge to impose
punishment identical to that New Jersey provides for crimes of the first
degree . . . ."4 The legislature's decision to call the practice "sentence
enhancement" was irrelevant.
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Blakely v. Washington,46
which applied Apprendi to Washington State's sentencing guidelines, and
with this opinion his anti-formalism grew stronger.47 He criticized
deference to legislative sentencing schemes, arguing that they provided no
clear limit to legislative power.48 In fact, Justice Scalia's functionalism
extends to the definition of the statutory maximum itself. Despite the use of
the term "statutory," the statute is not, under Blakely, the last word in
defining the statutory maximum. Instead, courts must look to how the law
operates functionally to determine the maximum sentence.49
If the judge had not found any facts in aggravation, Blakely faced a
41. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19.
42. Id. at 494.
43. Id at 469-70.
44. Id. at 471. While I have chosen to focus initially on time served to explain Apprendi's
holding, the imposition of stigma is central to Apprendi's concerns. My initial focus on time served is
only for the sake of clarity. I do not mean to suggest that stigma is an afterthought either in Apprendi or
in this analysis. Stigma is central to both. For more on Apprendi's discussion of stigma, see infra Part
II.B.I.
45. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491.
46. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
47. Id This article largely bypasses United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Doctrinally,
Booker applies Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at 226-27. The one exception is the
remedy-severing the portion of the statute which makes the guidelines mandatory-but this is
particular to the federal sentencing statute. Id. at 227. Moreover, while I realize that law professors
(including this one) generally clerk at the federal level and thus tend to normalize the federal experience,
I do not feel that the federal guidelines are the Platonic ideal of sentencing, nor are they necessarily the
best model with which to study sentencing doctrines. The federal system is just one system, and the
number of offenders sentenced in the federal system is dwarfed by those sentenced in state systems.
Total Correctional Population, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
tp&tid=l I (last modified Mar. 24, 2011) (showing that, at the end of 2009, 1,405,622 prisoners were in
the state system, while 208,118 were in the federal system).
48. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-07.
49. See Ball, supra note 11, at 950-52.
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presumptive sentence of fifty-three months. Because the judge did find
aggravating facts, however, Blakely was sentenced to ninety months. Both
of these sentences, however, were below the maximum term of 120 months
allowed by statute. The Supreme Court nevertheless vacated the sentence,
holding that the defendant was "sentenced to prison for more than three
years beyond what the law allowed . . . on the basis of a disputed finding
that he had acted with 'deliberate cruelty."' 50 The reasoning the Court used
turns on Blakely's functional definition of the statutory maximum
. . . . Washington's sentencing guidelines were binding; the
judge could only sentence Blakely to a maximum of fifty-three
months on the facts to which he pleaded guilty. The judge was
not permitted to impose a ninety-month sentence unless a jury
had found, or Blakely admitted, deliberate cruelty .... Pleading
guilty to the presumptive crime is not the same as pleading guilty
to the aggravated version of that crime, even if the [formal]
maximum sentence for the crime the legislature calls kidnapping
is greater than either.51
The statutory maximum, then, is not defined by statute, but by
practice. Even when a legislature explicitly defines the statutory maximum,
Justice Scalia's rule in Blakely requires courts to look beyond the statute to
its operation. This method, however, only applies to criminal statutes.
Justice Scalia's approach to civil statutes is another matter.
2. Civil Formalism: the Hendricks, Seling, and Doe Majorities
In Hendricks, Seling, and Doe, the Supreme Court majority upheld
civil penalties for sex offenders-civil commitment in HendrickS52 and
Seling5 3 and post-release registration in Doe.5 4  In all three cases, the
defendant argued that the statute was functionally criminal, punishing him
without the protections of criminal procedure (e.g., the prohibitions on ex
post facto punishments and/or double jeopardy).55 The majority in these
cases relied on the legislative text-though not exclusively-and denied
that it had or should have the power to look at how the statute functioned. 6
Justices Scalia and Thomas, diehard functionalists in the Apprendi context,
turned shy and deferential towards legislatures in the context of civil
50. Id at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
53. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 266-67 (2001).
54. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
55. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Seling, 531 U.S. at 263; Doe, 538 U.S. at 91-93.
56. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Seling, 531 U.S. at 262; Doe, 538 U.S. at 92-93.
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penalties.
Kansas v. Hendricks analyzed an SVP commitment statute and laid
out the general framework for analysis of civil statutes targeting sex
offenders.58  The Court used a two-part test, first looking to "ascertain
whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' proceedings."59
If it did, the Court could "reject the legislature's manifest intent only where
a party . . . provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to
deem it civil." 6 0 In other words, functional analysis can come in, but the
presumption is weighted heavily in favor of the legislature-a presumption
that is the opposite of what the state gets in the criminal context.
In holding the Kansas statute constitutional, Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, wrote that the civil/criminal distinction is a
question of statutory construction-whether, upon initial view, "the
legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' proceedings." 6 1 Defendant
Hendricks had argued that the statute's stated intent to provide treatment
was insincere, since the state had failed to provide any treatment for him.62
Justice Thomas replied that even if treatment were not the "'overriding' or
'primary' purpose in passing the Act" it did "not rule out the possibility that
an ancillary purpose of the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not
require us to conclude that the Act is punitive."63 In other words, as long as
there is some part of the statute that is possibly civil, the Court must defer to
the legislature's civil label.
Four years later, Seling v. Young rejected an as-applied challenge to
Washington State's SVP law,6 and further established that labels, not
effects, govern the analysis of civil statutes. Young alleged that his
conditions of confinement were "punitive"-that the "conditions and
restrictions at the Center [for sex offenders] were not reasonably related to a
legitimate nonpunitive goal." 5 In rejecting Young's challenge, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, reiterated that only "the clearest proof
that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect" would
57. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Seling, 531 U.S. at 269 (Scalia, J., concurring), 272 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Doe, 538 U.S. at 106 (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
59. Id.
60. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is unclear why the majority did not
discuss the Mendoza-Martinez factors in any detail, citing the case only once. Id. at 362. Justice
Breyer's dissent, however, concluded by referencing the Mendoza-Martinez factors: "This is not to say
that each of the factors the Court mentioned in Mendoza-Martinez on balance argues here in favor of a
constitutional characterization as 'punishment."' Id. at 394 (Breyer, J., dissenting). I discuss Mendoza-
Martinez in greater detail at Part III.B, infra.
61. Id. at 361.
62. Id. at 365.
63. Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
64. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 253 (2001).
65. Id. at 259.
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negate the State's civil label. 6 The Court would, instead, look to the statute
"on its face,, 6 7 since an as-applied standard "would never conclusively
resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a
final determination of the scheme's validity . . . ."68 The Court concluded
that "[t]he civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based
merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute."69
Justice Scalia concurred separately to emphasize that an as-applied
challenge to the implementation or the actual conditions of confinement
was foreclosed.70 Justice Scalia was even more deferential to the legislature
than O'Connor: it was error to look beyond the "statute on its face" to "the
character of the actual sanctions imposed."7  Instead, "the question of
criminal penalty vel non depends upon the intent of the legislature."7 2
Deference is in greater "accord with our sound and traditional reluctance to
be the initial interpreter of state law."73 This deferential Justice Scalia, of
course, bears little resemblance to the justice whose rulings in the Apprendi
line have, in Justice O'Connor's words, shown little hesitation in rolling
back "over 20 years of sentencing reform" and jeopardizing "tens of
thousands of criminal judgments . . . Nor is this method at all
consistent with the way in which the statutory maximum sentence was
defined in Blakely.7 s Blakely was nothing if not an "as applied" challenge,
since, to use Justice Scalia's language from his Seling concurrence, the
"statute on its face" in Blakely provided for a punishment greater than "the
character of the actual sanctions imposed." 7 6
In Smith v. Doe, the Court went out of its way to construe an
Alaska sex offender registration statute as civil, even though part of it was
codified in the criminal code.77 The statute required that defendants
pleading guilty to the relevant criminal sexual offenses be notified in
advance of the registration requirements78 and required that written
judgments for the relevant criminal offenses include the civil notification
requirements.79 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that
66. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 262.
68. Id. at 263.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 267 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 268 (internal citations omitted).
72. Id. at 269.
73. Id.
74. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
76. Seling, 531 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361
(1997)) ("Nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other
than a civil. . . scheme designed to protect the public from harm.").
78. Smith, 538 U.S. at 95.
79. Id.
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"partial codification of the Act in the State's criminal procedure code is not
sufficient to support a conclusion that the legislative intent was punitive."so
In this case, notice-itself used as key evidence of the statute's civil
nature -was particularly "important, for the scheme is enforced by
criminal penalties."8 2 Justice Kennedy's point here bears repeating: notice
made the law civil, particularly because its violations were punished
criminally.
On the second part of the Hendricks test, the effects of the law,
Justice Kennedy's opinion incorporated Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez into
its analysis of whether the statute was so punitive "in nature or effect" to
overcome the civil label.83 Mendoza-Martinez, a case from the 1960's, held
that a law allowing for the denationalization of draft dodgers violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment84 and
proposed a seven-factor test to determine whether a law was criminal or
civil:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
85purpose assigned ... .8
Even under Mendoza-Martinez, Justice Kennedy airily dismissed
any and all evidence that the civil law was criminal, no matter how
damning the evidence was.
Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that the registry resembled
the historical practice of shaming punishments;8 6 the essence of shaming
punishments was, he said, that they "staged a direct [physical] confrontation
between the offender and the public."8 7 He conceded that the information
in the Alaska registry was posted on the internet, whose geographic reach
"is greater than anything which could have been designed in colonial
80. Id.
81. Notwithstanding the fact that notice is one of the key interests Justice Scalia identifies in the
Apprendi rule, he joined the majority. See Ball, supra note 11, at 954, 967.
82. Smith, 538 U.S. at 96.
83. Id. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
84. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 193.
85. Id. at 168-69 (internal citations omitted). Mendoza-Martinez's test has been widely used in
other cases, but it was, technically, dictum because congressional intent indicated "conclusively that the
provisions in question can only be interpreted as punitive." Id. at 169 (internal citations omitted).
86. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98.
87. Id. at 98.
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times"" and included the offender's "name, aliases, identifying features,
address, place of employment, date of birth . . . [and] information about
vehicles to which he has access," 89 but the law was still not punitive
because the stated purpose of the statute was "to inform the public for its
own safety, not to humiliate the offender."90 As to the question whether the
law imposed "an affirmative disability or restraint,"9' any restraints were
relatively minor: the law "imposes no physical restraint, and so does not
resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic
affirmative disability or restraint."92
The fact that the statute served to deter crime-heretofore one of
the central goals of criminal punishment 93-did not make it criminal,
because "[a]ny number of governmental programs might deter crime
without imposing punishment." 94 Ultimately, "[a] statute is not deemed
punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive
aims it seeks to advance."95 A civil law need only use means that are
"reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective."96 Justice Kennedy thus
used his premise to drive his conclusion: given that the statute was not
punitive, evidence of its punitive effects was irrelevant. Justice Kennedy's
opinion still did not go far enough for Justice Thomas, who wrote
separately to reiterate that there could be no as-applied challenge to a
statute imposing civil penalties.9 7
B. Criminal Deference, Civil Functionalism
There is no clear cut symmetry on the other side of the argument:
no Justice takes positions that are equal and opposite to the positions of
Justices Scalia and Thomas, so it is not the case that both sides are equally
inconsistent in their approaches to civil and criminal statutes. Nevertheless,
I will discuss the positions taken by Justice Breyer in the Apprendi and sex
offender lines to argue that Justice Breyer is more deferential towards
criminal statutes than civil ones, and that he is more likely to analyze civil
statutes by looking at their effects on liberty. I will also note here that
throughout his opinions, there continues to be no effort to reify the
methodology used in one set of cases with another. It is as though
88. Id at 99.
89. Id. at 90.
90. Id. at 99.
91. Id. at 97.
92. Id at 100.
93. See Klein, supra note 32, at 699-702 (noting that deterrence is one of two traditional goals of
criminal punishment).
94. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
95. Id. at 103.
96. Id. at 105.
97. Id. at 106 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Apprendi and the sex offender cases occupied different legal universes.
1. Legislative Deference: the Apprendi Dissents
Because I focus on Justice Breyer's opinions in civil cases," I will
here briefly recap his position about legislative deference in the Apprendi
line. The problem is that Justice Breyer's sentencing jurisprudence is not
so much formal as pragmatic. Sentencing is a product of three branches of
government; 99 accordingly, compromises need to be made. Justice Breyer's
Apprendi dissent argues that "the real world of criminal justice" prevents
any theoretical, ideal answer to the problem of what limits (if any) can be
placed on the legislature's ability to define elements and enhancements. 100
Criminal justice "can function only with the help of procedural
compromises, particularly in respect to sentencing. And those
compromises, which are themselves necessary for the fair functioning of
the criminal justice system, preclude implementation of the procedural
model that [Apprendi] reflects."10' To the element/enhancement distinction,
then, "theory does not provide an answer."1 0 2 Ultimately, Justice Breyer
sees the use of sentencing as a practical means of bridging the gap between
charges and real conduct, 103 and while labeling is a power reserved by the
legislature, the Due Process Clause protects against its arbitrary exercise. 10 4
Thus, although Justice Breyer acknowledged in Blakely that
"classically speaking, the difference between a traditional sentencing factor
and an element of a greater offense often comes down to a legislative
choice about which label to affix," he disagreed that the Sixth Amendment
therefore required "identical treatment of the two scenarios."'o Justice
Breyer argued that the goal of the system was fairness, and that radically
restricting the legislature's power "prevents the legislature from seeking
sentencing systems that are consistent with, and indeed may help to
advance, the Constitution's greater fairness goals."1 0 6 In some ways, then,
Justice Breyer is a functionalist-albeit one who uses legislative labels as a
98. See supra note 7.
99. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 330 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 559.
103. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250-51 (2005).
104. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 562-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 344 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 329 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 345; see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 296 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Judges and sentencing officials have a broad view and long-term commitment to
correctional systems. Juries do not. Judicial officers and corrections professionals, under the guidance
and control of the legislature, should be encouraged to participate in an ongoing manner to improve the
various sentencing schemes in our country.").
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means of best achieving fairness.' 07
2. Civil Functionalism: Hendricks, Crane, and Doe
The dissents in Hendricks and Doe argued that the constitutionality
of the laws in question depended on how they functioned, not simply on the
legislature's label.' 08 While Justice Breyer's positions in these cases and
the Apprendi line provide less contrast than the positions taken by Justices
Scalia and Thomas,109 Justice Breyer does, in fact, look to function, not
form, in these cases.
In Hendricks, Justice Breyer's dissent centered on the limits of
legislative labels. Even though Kansas called its law civil, the way in
which the statute operated convinced Justice Breyer that it was "an effort to
inflict further punishment upon [Hendricks].""l0 Some of the statute's
provisions bore an "obvious" resemblance to criminal punishments,
including secure confinement, incarceration against one's will, and
incapacitation-which Justice Breyer, citing Blackstone, said was an
objective of the criminal law."' The procedures surrounding the
commitment looked criminal, particularly the requirement that the District
Attorney begin the commitment proceedings.1 2  Even if one were to
conclude that these similarities to criminal law could not prove a civil law
was, in fact, criminal, "neither can the word 'civil' written into the statute. .
. by itself prove the contrary."' Justice Breyer argued that the state's
failure to provide treatment to the plaintiff Hendricks belied the real goal of
the Act: that it was designed to punish, not treat. "[A] statutory scheme that
provides confinement that does not reasonably fit a practically available,
medically oriented treatment objective, more likely reflects a primarily
punitive legislative purpose."ll 4 Actions and implementation spoke louder
than words.
Justice Breyer was also unwilling to defer to the Kansas
legislature's policy decisions: Even if treatment were the goal of the law, he
was skeptical about the way in which treatment was structured. Kansas
waited to treat offenders until they had served almost all of their prison
107. As I shall discuss in Part II, Apprendi incorporated Winship, a case which used the Due
Process Clause to achieve this very end: fundamental fairness. See infra note 140 and accompanying
text.
108. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
109. See supra note 39. Perhaps this impression is due to Justice Breyer's less colorful and/or
absolutist style.
110. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373-74 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id at 379 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 11-12).
112. Id at 380.
113. Id at 381.
114. Id at 383; see also id. at 381-82 (discussing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364 (1986), in which
the presence of treatment programs was evidence that the goal of a state's civil commitment statute was
treatment, not punishment).
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sentences.s15  Justice Breyer thought that if the state were serious about
treatment, it would have begun treatment programs soon after an offender
arrived in prison. 1 16 "[I]t is particularly difficult to see why legislators who
specifically wrote into the statute a finding that 'prognosis for rehabilitating
... in a prison setting is poor' would leave an offender in that setting for
months or years before beginning treatment." 1 7  Ultimately, what a state
did was more important than what it said. "[W]hen a State decides
offenders can be treated and confines an offender to provide that treatment,
but then refuses to provide it, the refusal to treat while a person is fully
incapacitated begins to look punitive."" 8
Although Justice Breyer joined the majority in invalidating an as-
applied challenge to an SVP law in Seling,ll9 one year later he wrote the
opinion invalidating the Kansas SVP statute in Kansas v. Crane1 2 0 (over the
dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas),121 holding that a state must make
some factual determination of an offender's lack of control before confining
him. 12 2 In Crane, Justice Breyer looked beyond the text of the statute to see
what "constitutional requirements substantively limit[ed] the civil
commitment of a dangerous sexual offender." 23 After acknowledging the
Court's traditional deference to the legislature where mental illness was
concerned,12 4 Justice Breyer wrote that the state was required to make some
determination that an SVP could not control himself,12 5 concluding that it
was required to prove "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." 26 This
substantive requirement separated the SVP from the "dangerous but typical
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case" 27 and prevented civil
commitments from becoming a mechanism for retribution or deterrence-
which remain the province of criminal law.12 8 The control requirement was
phrased as a standard, not a rule, because protection of liberty when it
comes to mental illness is "not always best enforced through precise bright-
115. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that this "time-related
circumstance seems deliberate").
116. Id. at 385.
117. Id at 386 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)).
118. Id. at 390.
119. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 252 (2001). For a discussion of Seling, see supra notes 64-
76 and accompanying text.
120. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
121. Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 409.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 410 (noting that the Court has traditionally left the task of defining such terms as
"personality disorder," "mental abnormality," and "mental illness" to the legislature (quoting Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 359)).
125. See id. at 412 (holding that the Constitution does not permit the "commitment of the type of
dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination").
126. Id. at 413.
127. Id. at 413.
128. Id. at 412.
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line rules."1 29 Justice Scalia, in dissent, again argued that the judiciary
should defer to legislative labels: "we have never required state legislatures
to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes.
Rather, we have traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of
a medical nature that have legal significance."' 30
Finally, in Doe, the dissent used the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
argue that the formally civil statute was "punitive in effect." 31 Justice
Ginsburg, in a dissent which Justice Breyer joined, wrote that the statute's
"onerous and intrusive obligations on convicted sex offenders," as well as
the "profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism" resulting from
public notification of their crimes, meant that that it was "[b]eyond doubt"
that the statute involved an "affirmative disability or restraint."' 3 2  The
statute's restrictions were triggered by "past crime alone, not current
dangerousness."3 Ultimately, the statute's "excessiveness in relation to its
nonpunitive purpose" was dispositive: the scope of the statute went well
beyond the "legitimate civil purpose" of alerting the public to dangerous
offenders in their midst because it included "all convicted sex offenders,
without regard to their future dangerousness" and keyed the duration of the
reporting requirement not to any determination of "a particular offender's
risk of reoffending, but to whether the offense of conviction qualified as
aggravated." 34  What was accorded heaviest weight was the statute's
failure to make any provision whatever for the possibility of rehabilitation:
"[o]ffenders [could not] shorten their registration or notification period
even on the clearest demonstration of rehabilitation or conclusive proof of
physical incapacitation."l 35  Doe himself had completed a treatment
program, remarried, and was deemed "a very low risk of re-offending." 36
Nevertheless, Alaska could "publicly . . . label him a 'Registered Sex
Offender' for the rest of his life." 37
II. In re Winship, Apprendi, Due Process, and Stigma
Apprendi is a functional case, not a formal one,'3 8 and it seems
strange that its protections should stop at the formal line between civil and
criminal. But Apprendi's holding about the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof comes from a case that itself rejects the formal line
129. Id. at 413.
130. Id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)).
131. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. Id (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. at 116.
134. Id. at 116-17.
135. Id at 117.
136. Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. Id. at 117-18.
138. See supra Part I.A.I.
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between civil and criminal: In re Winship.13 9 Winship grounded its holding
in due process, 140 and its holding was imported into Apprendi itself.14 1
Apprendi is not, therefore, just a "criminal" rule that applies via the Sixth
Amendment, but a due process rule that applies via standards of
fundamental fairness. Reclaiming the central role in criminal procedure
played by a nominally civil case suggests that something beyond
formalism-something substantive-should govern the level of procedural
protection in a given case.
Winship identifies two liberty interests-first, the interest in
avoiding a commitment to reform school, and second, the stigma of being
adjudged a delinquent.14 2 This stigmatic interest is a liberty interest in its
own right, one which Apprendi also identifies separately.14 3 This Part does
not argue that stigma should be part of the due process calculation-rather,
it points out that stigma is already a part of the calculation, via Winship and
Apprendi. There are two problems this raises: stigma has been invoked
without being defined, and the work it is doing has not been fully explored.
In this Part, I begin by revisiting Winship and Apprendi and
pointing to the many places in both cases where stigma, not just time in
confinement, is identified as a liberty interest. I argue that the presence or
absence of stigma explains the difference between deprivations which
require Apprendil Winship protections and those which do not. Without
stigma, it is difficult to draw a principled distinction between civil and
criminal commitments. That is, when Justice Scalia ignores stigma and
looks solely at time served (the "pure time" approach), he fails to justify
why there is no Apprendi right in civil commitment cases. In Section B, I
sketch out a preliminary definition of stigma, drawing on sociology's
modified labeling theory. In this theory, stigma is defined as "labeling,
stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination" in a context where
power allows these components to take hold.'" That is, stigma involves the
indiscriminate application of overbroad labels that generate socioeconomic
deprivation. I discuss the implications of this definition in Part III.
139. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
140. See id. at 368 ("[W]here a 12-year-old child is charged with an act of stealing which renders
him liable to confinement for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due process . . . the case against
him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 260
(N.Y. 1960) (Fuld, J., dissenting))).
141. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at
364).
142. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (noting that "the accused during a criminal prosecution
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction").
143. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363). As I discuss in the
following sections, stigma also operates within the criminal context to distinguish between retributive
punishments and utilitarian ones. See infra Part II.B.
144. Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REv. Soc. 363, 380 (2001).
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A. In re Winship, the Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure
Winship rejected the idea that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof applied only in formally criminal cases. 14 5 The irony is
that Winship, via Apprendi, has influenced criminal law much more than
civil law, even though Winship itself is civil.
Winship was a twelve-year-old boy who stole $112 from a
woman's purse. 146  He was not subjected to a criminal trial: he was a
juvenile subject to civil commitment,14 7 charged not with a crime but with
"an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult."1 48  A
judge (not a jury)14 9 found by a preponderance of the evidence that Winship
had done the acts with which he was charged.150  Winship appealed,
arguing that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the essentials of
due process and fair treatment required during the adjudicatory stage when
a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult."' 5 ' The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
adjudication, 15 2 and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.153
The New York Court of Appeals used a formal approach in
upholding the trial court's use of the preponderance standard of proof:
because delinquency adjudication was not (formally) a conviction,
delinquency status was not (formally) a crime, and the proceedings were
not (formally) criminal, the rules of criminal procedure did not apply. 154
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this line of thinking in its reversal,
145. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66 (holding that "civil labels and good intentions do not
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts" (citing In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 36 (1966))).
146. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 360.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 359.
149. I mention the distinction here only to underscore the fact that, pace Justice Scalia, the
standard of proof and the jury right are analytically-and precedentially-distinct, and that one can be
present without the other. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354 (1997) (SVP adjudication
made before a jury, even though the case was civil). The jury right was not at issue in Winship-indeed,
the Supreme Court later decided that juvenile proceedings did not require juries. McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971) (holding that a trial by jury not required in juvenile delinquency
proceedings). But while Winship is silent on the matter, judicial factfinding in juvenile contexts is
consistent with the medical/rehabilitative role of the judiciary that I explore in Part IV, infra. See, e.g.,
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366 (discussing whether the case will impair the court's opportunities for "a
wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized treatment"). This might be
one area where the potentially punitive nature of SVP proceedings would be more pronounced if juries
were introduced. See Editorial, Let Juries Determine Sex Offenders' Fate, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1,
2009, at 8 (arguing that current practice-allowing sex offenders to decide whether a judge or a jury will
hear their case-should be changed to allow prosecutors to seek jury trials).
150. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 359.
151. Id (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
152. Id. at 360.
153. Id. at 361.
154. Id at 365.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 138 2010-2011
The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure
looking beyond "the civil label of convenience" to the functional effect of
the proceeding: "civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate
the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts." 55 Despite
the rehabilitative interests of the juvenile system, the state could not subject
a "child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the
possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him
were he an adult."156
The Supreme Court was not simply saying that juvenile
proceedings were the same as criminal proceedings;15 7 it was identifying
what particular interests in the criminal context were analogous to those in
Winship's case. The first part of the Winship opinion dealt exclusively with
the standard of proof required for a criminal charge' 58 as a means of
identifying the reason for these protections, finding two interests of
"immense importance": "the possibility that [the accused] may lose his
liberty upon conviction and . .. the certainty that he would be stigmatized
by the conviction."' 59 Given both the stigma and liberty interests at stake,
"a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual
should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt."o60 Due process, then, is required by the
nature and weight of the interests in criminal cases,16' not because there is
something magical about the word "criminal." The Court then identified
similar interests in the juvenile context: "[t]he same considerations that
demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply
as well to the innocent child." 62 Namely, "the stigma of a finding that he
violated a criminal law and to the possibility of institutional confinement on
proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult."' 6 3
Justice Harlan, concurring, expounded on the reasoning behind the
majority's holding. The lower standard of proof for civil proceedings is
grounded on the assumption that civil suits are largely private.'6 Society
has nothing invested in the outcome, which merely alters the distribution
between one party and another. In criminal cases, however, "one party has
at stake an interest of transcending value," and our society has determined
that it is "far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free." 65 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof reflects a
155. Id. at 365-66 (internal citations omitted).
156. Id. at 367.
157. Id. at 359 n.1.
158. Id at 361-64.
159. Id at 363.
160. Id. at 363-64.
161. Id. at 364.
162. Id. at 365.
163. Id. at 367.
164. See id. at 371-72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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"fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous
factual determinations."16 6
While the consequences of a juvenile proceeding were not identical
to those of a criminal case, Harlan wrote, factual errors exposed "the
accused to a complete loss of his personal liberty through a state-imposed
confinement" and "stigmatize[d] a youth in that it is by definition bottomed
on a finding that the accused committed a crime."l 67  The heightened
standard of proof, ultimately, required merely that the finder of fact "be
more confident" in the judgment that he was making.16 8
In the years immediately following Winship, the case was cited as
authority that a statute's effects, not its civil or criminal label, governed due
process analysis. Two years after Winship, Justice Douglas observed in
dissent:
It is no answer to say that petitioners' commitments were in
'civil' proceedings and that the requirement for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required only in 'criminal' cases. In re
Gault and In re Winship specifically rejected this distinction and
looked instead at the interests involved and the actual nature of
the proceedings.169
Juvenile cases immediately preceding and following Winship also used this
analysis. In re Gault, several years earlier, stated that "commitment is a
deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is
called 'criminal' or 'civil.""170  But after a while, Winship's civil
provenance was forgotten. In 1987, the Supreme Court cited Winship as a
criminal case, not a civil one.171 Indeed, in 1981 the Supreme Court even
cited Winship itself for the proposition that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof had never been applied to a civil case.17 2
166. Id. at 370.
167. Id. at 374.
168. Id. at 375 (noting that, in this case, "the youth did the act with which he has been charged.").
169. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 364 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (dissenting to the dismissal of a writ of certiorari deemed improvidently granted in
the case of a challenge by delinquents to Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law on the grounds that it
was vague and imposed civil commitment without proper procedural safeguards).
170. 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
171. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) ("Thus, the evidentiary
standard is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues, be it a criminal case, see In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), or a civil case.").
172. See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981)
("However, the [Supreme] Court has never required the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard to be
applied in a civil case. This unique standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitution, is
regarded as a critical part of the moral force of the criminal law, In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, and we
should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases." (quoting Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Winship is, of course, both a civil case itself and an important case
in criminal procedure because Apprendi relies on it for its standard of proof
holding. 173  One reason to focus on Winship is to underscore a seldom-
acknowledged feature of the Apprendi rule: that it derives not just from the
jury guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, but also from the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment. Though Justice Scalia's opinions in later
cases in the line (e.g., Booker and Blakely) tie Apprendi to the Sixth
Amendment alone,174 Apprendi itself makes frequent reference to due
process and cites Winship in support of its due process holding.'75 Indeed,
any cursory reading of the Apprendi opinion uncovers numerous examples
of how important due process is to the holding of the case, especially the
standard of proof holding, which relies entirely on Winship and which does
not, in any way, involve the Sixth Amendment.' 76 Apprendi's due process
analysis is hiding in plain sight; discussing Apprendi while focusing
exclusively on the Sixth Amendment misses much of Apprendi's central
concern.
Justice Stevens's Apprendi opinion framed the question presented
solely in terms of due process, 77 and characterized Apprendi's argument as,
"inter alia, that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
requires that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was
based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt," citing Winship
in support.'7 8 These due process concerns were not simply the result of the
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment jury right against the states. Stevens
clearly isolated both due process incorporation of the Sixth Amendment and
the discrete due process right to have every element proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.179 Jones v. United States, which first formulated the
Apprendi rule before deciding on other grounds, could not have used
incorporation: it was a federal case which used the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.180
173. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
174. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J, concurring); Oregon v. Ice,
129 S. Ct. 711, 723 (2009) (Scalia, J, dissenting). For two examples, see supra note 9.
175. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,469, 523 (2000).
176. Ball, supra note 11, at 961-64.
177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000) ("The question presented is whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an
increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the
basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
178. Id. at 471 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). The New Jersey Supreme Court had
also used due process to analyze whether a given fact was an element or a sentence enhancement, since
"labels . .. would not yield an answer to Apprendi's constitutional question." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472
(internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 477 n.3 ("[Appellant] relies entirely on the fact that the 'due process of law' that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime encompasses the right
to a trial by jury and the right to have every element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
(internal citations omitted)).
180. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6). Justice Stevens noted:
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Stevens's Apprendi opinion did not, of course, deny the importance
of the Sixth Amendment. My point is not to replace a Sixth-Amendment-
only reading of Apprendi with one that focuses exclusively on due process.
Apprendi is indisputably about both due process and the Sixth Amendment:
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing
importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without
"due process of law," and the guarantee that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury." Taken together, these rights
indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to "a jury determination
that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."8 1
Apprendi is not, therefore, just about the Sixth Amendment; it is
about a bundle of rights.
B. The WinshiplApprendi Due Process Interest in Stigma
Winship and Apprendi both clearly identified stigma as a liberty
interest in its own right.182 Due process analysis, then, must account for
both the deprivation of liberty and the imposition of stigma. In this
Section, I establish that stigma is a key part of the Winship/Apprendi
analysis and examine how the presence or absence of stigma might begin to
better explain the difference between civil and criminal punishments.
1. Stigma in Winship/Apprendi
The first part of the Winship opinion dealt exclusively with the
standard of proof required for a criminal charge.18 3 The reason criminal
charges require a heightened standard of proof is because there are two
"interests of immense importance" at work: "the possibility that [a
defendant] may lose his liberty upon conviction and .. . the certainty that he
would be stigmatized by the conviction."1 84 Due process, then, is required
due to the nature and weight of these interests: condemnation (or calumny)
We there noted that 'under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' The
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a state
statute.
181. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 510 (1995)).
182. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495.
183. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64.
184. Id. at 363.
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and the deprivation of his freedom.'8 5
Justice Harlan's concurrence underscored the point. The New York
statute used in Winship distinguished between a juvenile delinquent and a
"' [p]erson in need of supervision' (PINS)."' 6 While findings of fact could
result in supervision for either category, only the delinquent label was
stigmatic. The PINS category merely described someone who was
incorrigible, and the consequences of error in "a PINS type case" were "by
no means identical to those involved [in a delinquency adjudication]. 1
In his Apprendi opinion, Justice Stevens incorporated Winship's
analysis of the liberty interests at stake, identifying not just restraints on
liberty, but the imposition of stigma. "Prosecution subjects the criminal
defendant both to 'the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and . . . the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction."" 88 The Apprendi rule kicked in when "both the loss of liberty
and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened." 89 Ultimately:
The degree of criminal culpability the legislature chooses to
associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has
significant implications both for a defendant's very liberty, and
for the heightened stigma associated with an offense the
legislature has selected as worthy of greater punishment.190
In Apprendi's case, "Both in terms of absolute years behind bars,
and because of the more severe stigma attached, the differential here is
unquestionably of constitutional significance."' 9'
2. Is Stigma Doing Any Work? The Limitations of the "Pure Time"
Approach
The mere fact that Justice Stevens's Apprendi opinion relied on
stigma is not, in itself, dispositive of how Apprendi should be read. After
all, Justice Scalia did not deem either stigma or due process important
enough to spend much time on them in Blakely, Booker, or any of his other
decisions, concurrences, and dissents in the Apprendi line. In this section I
will argue, however, that Justice Scalia's decision to ignore these two
185. Id. at 364.
186. Id. at 374 n.6 (Harlan, J., concurring).
187. Id.
188. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
189. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484. The opposite was also true; Apprendi did not apply when a
defendant was not exposed to "a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict
according to statute" or "a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone." Id. at 490
n.16.
190. Id. at 495.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
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interests is a mistake: stigma plays an important role in the analysis of
criminal and civil penalties, one which due process is best suited to address.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in the recent Apprendi case Oregon v. Ice,
explained Apprendi functionally.19 2  In his view, the sole question was
whether a given finding of fact increases the potential maximum amount of
time a defendant would serve in prison.'93  I call this the "pure time"
approach. Justice Scalia's view is that the relative magnitude of
punishment can be measured only by duration. Consecutive sentences
therefore necessarily result in greater punishment. In fact, the decision to
sentence concurrently or consecutively "is more important than a jury
verdict of innocence on any single count: Two consecutive 10-year
sentences are in most circumstances a more severe punishment than any
number of concurrent 10-year sentences."' 94
Justice Scalia's interpretation reaches a result which, on first blush,
is more consistent with Apprendi, but fails to explain why Apprendi does
not govern advisory systems'95 or civil commitments. In both of these
instances, factual findings can also increase time served. Time served is
thus the only important dimension of punishment-unless we are talking
about time served for civil penalties, in which case it is irrelevant.196 But if
function trumps form, it should not matter if confinement is called civil
commitment, criminal punishment, or Mary Jane.' 97 After all, a civil label
on time served doesn't affect the amount of time served, just its name.
Moreover, Apprendi would clearly govern a criminal statute that punished
only by fines; time in prison is thus neither a necessary nor sufficient
192. 129 S. Ct. 711, 720 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). I discuss Ice in greater detail in Part IV,
infra.
193. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 720.
194. Id. at 721.
195. For more on the particular definition of this term, and the ways in which a lack of common
understanding of phrases such as "indeterminate sentencing" and "determinate sentencing" create
genuine doctrinal difficulties, see Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era ofSentencing Reform, 54 EMORY
L.J. 377, 382-83 (2005) (explaining that "indeterminate systems use discretionary parole release while
determinate systems do not" and that both systems can be discretionary or nondiscretionary, and guided
or unguided).
196. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 720-23.
197. For a view that labels are the sine qua non of stigma, see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional
Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending
the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 1325, 1353 (1991) ("[S]tigma might be measured
by the legislature's intention. In fact, the cases indicate that the key factor used to separate civil from
criminal proceedings is the label affixed by the legislature. If stigma is to be our benchmark, this is how
it should be determined."). Cheh grounds her position in the argument that courts are ill-suited to figure
out the community's moral positions and that legislation "clearly reflects the community's moral
judgment that it is deviant, unacceptable, and, therefore, to be officially and publically condemned." Id.
at 1353. See also King & Klein, supra note 8, at 1487 (arguing that Apprendi's value is akin to a "clear
statement" rule requiring legislatures to "be clear ... about the discretion they are delegating to judges
and about the extent of punishment they are authorizing for an offense."). Cheh's position to me
overstates the efficiency of the democratic "market" for morality, while simultaneously underestimating
the ability of the jury to discern community values. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 11, at Part II.B. l.a. In
Cheh's defense, her paper was written before Apprendi.
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condition of either punishment or a criminal statute.1 98 In the end, it seems
a "strange exception" to commit oneself to a functional method except in
certain formal circumstances. 199 That is, if "sentence enhancement" is not a
magic phrase that relieves a state of Apprendi's burdens, it is uncertain why
the word "civil" is. Justice Scalia's approach does not ask or explain why
we have the rule; it instead seeks only to ask whether certain predicates
exist, and, if they do, applies the rule.200
C. What We Talk About When We Talk About Stigma
An obvious criticism of using stigma as the dividing line between
civil and criminal is that it merely shifts the problem without solving it.
Without a substantive definition of stigma, stigma itself is just another
label. If we reject the use of the magic words "enhancement" and "civil"
only to encourage the use of a new magic word, "stigma," we have gained
nothing. We may, in fact, actually have lost something: even if Justice
Scalia's mechanical view is unsatisfying, we can all at least agree on what
incarceration is, and we can all do Justice Scalia's math (more time equals
more punishment). 201 Perhaps a clear but imperfectly nuanced rule is
preferable to an unclear but perfectly nuanced one.
In this section, I draw on both theoretical and empirical
sociological findings about stigma in an attempt to lend the term some
substance and make it more than just a simple tautology (e.g., we punish
those actions we deem stigmatic, and they are stigmatic because we punish
them). The sociological literature has the added benefit of explaining and
empirically demonstrating how stigmatic labels result in real-world
privations.
The word "stigma" comes from a Greek word (literally "mark,
made by a punctured instrument, brand") used to denote the ancient Greek
practice of branding slaves and other outcasts, people who were not full
198. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) ("[T]he mere fact that a person is
detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment."
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 ("If
detention for the purpose of protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted punishment,
then all involuntary civil commitments would have to be considered punishment. But we have never so
held."); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 272-73 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
confinement is not a dispositive factor in making something criminal).
199. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Justice Scalia has argued in other circumstances that procedural rules do not guarantee
substantive outcomes. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (finding that the
Confrontation Clause provides for the particular mechanism of cross-examination, not a guarantee of
evidentiary reliability). This is, of course, quite a formalistic approach at odds with the functionalism he
uses elsewhere, and it means that civil commitments tend, in reality, to get less protection, because they
do not have specific procedural guarantees associated with them.
201. Of course, the notion of the statutory maximum isn't exactly straightforward, as the
maximum sentence in Blakely shows. See supra at notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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members of ancient Greek society.202 Stigma now refers to a permanent
sign or mark which devalues.203 Sociologists use the term stigma to refer to
non-physical marks that nevertheless isolate certain segments of society
from the mainstream.20 One initial theory posited that stigmatic labels in
some way acted as self-fulfilling prophecies. This theory, "labeling
theory," suggested that individuals who were labeled as deviants
internalized those labels and became the deviants they were branded to
be.205
In this Article, I will use "modified labeling theory" to define
stigma. Modified labeling theory suggests a new mechanism by which
stigmatic isolation occurs: the individual's desire to manage shame leads
him to follow strategies such as withdrawal and secrecy, and it is these
reactions which generate "secondary deviance."20 6 Secondary deviance is,
therefore, "not a direct result of labeling, but rather an indirect result of
coping, or stigma management, which has the ironic effect of shaping the
conditions under which secondary deviance is more likely."207
In particular, the modified labeling framework I will use comes
from the work of Bruce Link and Jo Phelan, both because it has given rise
to a number of empirical studies and because it provides a comprehensive
structural framework for theorizing how stigmatic labels burden those to
whom they are applied. Link and Phelan identify five components of
stigma-"labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and
discrimination"-and conclude that stigmatization occurs when these five
factors are present "in a power situation that allows the components" to take
hold.208 In other words, stereotypes of, say, law professors cannot be
stigmatic, since these members of society are relatively powerful and will
suffer no isolation or status loss as a result of these stereotypes.
Each of the five factors of stigma deserves a bit more explanation.
The first, labeling, refers to the ways in which salient differences are
202. 16 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 689 (2d ed. 1989).
203. Id (defining "stigma" as "a mark of disgrace or infamy; a sign of severe censure or
condemnation, regarded as impressed on a person or thing.").
204. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3
(Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1986) (1963).
205. Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and Stigma Management Among
Those to be Labeled "Ex-Con, " 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 295, 298 (2008).
206. Id. at 299-300.
207. Id. at 301 (discussing Bruce Link et al., A Modified Labeling Theory Approach to Mental
Illness, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 400 (1989)).
208. Link & Phelan, supra note 144, at 377. Link and Phelan focus on power because "it takes
power to stigmatize." Id. at 375. As they argue:
[I]f we only used the cognitive components of labeling and stereotyping to define
stigma, groups like lawyers, politicians, and white people would have to be
considered stigmatized groups. Our incorporation of power, status loss, and
discrimination allows the formal definition we derived to cohere with current
understandings of what a stigmatized group is.
Id. at 377.
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identified (e.g., "that person is a sex offender"). 2 09 Link and Phelan use the
word "label" rather than "attribute" because these categories are socially
constructed. 2 10  That is, the word "attribute" (perhaps subtly) connotes a
quality in the person; a label is something others attach to the person. The
second factor describes how these labels are associated with negative
stereotypes (e.g., "sex offenders are incorrigible").2 1' Stereotypes need not
fit the label exactly, nor need they be empirically valid. Invoking a
negative set of characteristics is enough. Third, the stigmatized person is
separated, becoming a "them" distinct from "us," and, in extreme cases,
"the stigmatized person is thought to be so different from 'us' as to be not
really human" (e.g., "sex offenders are so incorrigible that they cannot be
reintegrated into society"). 212 Fourth, the now-isolated person suffers status
loss, which refers to changes in life outcomes "like income, education,
psychological well-being, housing status, medical treatment, and health"
(e.g., "sex offenders are so incorrigible and incapable of reentry that they
cannot live near parks and schools").213  The final component is
discrimination, where "successful negative labeling and stereotyping
[results in] a general downward placement of a person in a status hierarchy"
(e.g., "sex offenders living under freeway overpasses").2 14 Again, the
209. Id. at 367 ("The vast majority of human differences are ignored and are therefore socially
irrelevant.").
210. Id. at 368.
211. Id. at 369; see also, e.g., Robert Doyle & Craig Haney, Proposition 83, Framing and Public
Attitudes Toward Sex Offenders: An Application of Heuristic Models of Social Judgment 1 (Aug. 3,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tractid=1444688 (noting that newspaper articles "tended to portray sex offenders as predatory and non-
human, focusing primarily on the most extreme cases and prolific offenders, without regard for the vast
heterogeneity of individuals and offenses subsumed by the term 'sex offender. . . ."').
212. Link & Phelan, supra note 144, at 370. The idea of incorrigibility might be a crucial part of
what makes civil commitments punitive. If we identify someone as dangerous but then argue that we
cannot treat him, we are justified in locking him up. While we acknowledge that the incorrigible are not
as morally culpable as the criminal, we nevertheless need make no effort to help them. The results end
up looking the same: we don't need to rehabilitate someone because we're punishing them, or we don't
need to rehabilitate someone because even though they are not being punished, there's nothing we can
do for them anyway. Incorrigibility also feeds into the Greek notion of stigma as a permanent
(unremovable) mark. See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REv. 237, 253 (2009). As Dolovich notes:
If prisoners are 'a breed apart,' and if, despite knowing the consequences, they
persist in their 'choice to be bad,' then perhaps there is nothing left for society
but to shut them out of the public space altogether, in a place where the threat
they pose can be contained. In this way, society never has to confront the fact
that the perceived need to control an out-of-control population may stem from
the conditions, both inside and outside the prison, to which the incarcerated have
been subjected.
213. Link & Phelan, supra note 144, at 371.
214. Id. One author has suggested that this downward placement in society is not a bug, but a
feature. See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON
519, 536 (1996) (using a law and economics analysis to suggest that stigma is "a cheap and efficient
punishment" that effectively increases the cost of offending by increasing the costs of re-entering the
labor market, thus improving deterrence without increased government outlays).
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stigmatized person is not merely spoken of poorly-she does not and
cannot participate meaningfully in society.
Labeling theory originally considered non-penal contexts, dealing
with labels such as race, gender, IQ, sexual orientation, and physical
handicaps.215 Subsequent research has examined the stigma associated with
the civil adjudication of juvenile delinquents, the civil/collateral regulation
of sex offenders, and criminal adjudication.
Winship's analysis of juvenile delinquency was prescient: the
juvenile delinquent label is, itself, a stigmatic label, which ironically drives
"delinquents" towards further delinquent behavior. A recent study of urban
adolescents found that official adjudication as a delinquent "may create or
enhance the reputation of a juvenile as a criminal in his or her community,"
most notably among peers and parents.216 Deviant labels then embed
juveniles into deviant social groups through association and exclusion:2 17
other "delinquents" accept actual delinquent behavior and simultaneously
provide "social shelter from those who react negatively" to the delinquent
label itself.218 Juvenile delinquents are more comfortable among similarly
stigmatized people away from the "righteous gaze" of parents,2 19 and they
structure their lives to avoid the uneasiness, embarrassment, and ambiguity
of interactions with non-delinquents; interactions that require "intense
efforts at impression management.",2 20 Winship, then, got it right when it
held that the stigma attached to the label of delinquency-and not merely
the loss of liberty that resulted from that label-deserved the protection of
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.2 2 1 Stigma is a sentence of
its own, with real impacts on juveniles' lives.
A study of registered sex offenders in Kentucky also reported
stigmatizing effects from the (formally) civil registration process, 222
directly countering Justice Kennedy's assertion in Doe that the fact of
conviction, not sex offender registration, is the cause of economic loss. 22 3
Subjects lost friends, jobs, or housing, and were harassed or treated rudely
215. Link & Phelan, supra note 144, at 367.
216. Jon Gunnar Bernburg et al., Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness, and Subsequent
Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory, 43 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 69 (2006).
When deviance "is publicly announced and defined as immoral, as occurs during formal sanctions, the
immoral character of the actor is highlighted." Id.
217. Id at 70.
218. Id at 68.
219. Id at 70.
220. Id at 69.
221. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (holding that the state could not subject "the child
to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of institutional
confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult.").
222. Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 67 (2005).
223. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003).
[Vol. 38:2148
HeinOnline  -- 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 148 2010-2011
The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure
as a result of registration.2 24 Registration imposed a stigma that was
"visible" and durable: "for almost all offenders . . . all or nearly all persons
knew of the offenses." 225  Stigma management strategies led to perverse
results, suggesting that even though we can shame offenders upon release,
we might not want to. The actual stigma of registration in Kentucky tended
to be most pronounced for offenders who assaulted adults, not those who
assaulted children. 2 26 Because the added shame of registration provided
those who sexually assaulted children "with yet another piece of
information to protect and hide," the result was that "such offenders are
pushed toward isolation and they may actually lose support systems that
can be critical to preventing reoffending." 2 27
Bruce Westem 2 2 8 and Devah Pager 22 9 have each examined ways in
which criminal stigma-particularly when coupled with race-leads to
economic disenfranchisement. Though neither Western nor Pager
explicitly uses the Link/Phelan framework,230 their findings fit it neatly. A
criminal record, which Pager calls "the credentialing of stigma,"2 3 1
establishes the stigmatic label. While there might be some evidence that a
criminal record is an accurate signal of, say, untrustworthiness, and that
given the potential harms, it might be rational to exaggerate the threats a
particular ex-felon might pose,232 Pager's research suggests that racial and
criminal stereotypes reinforce and amplify each other,2 3 3 and that "the
combination of minority status and a criminal record results in almost total
exclusion from [the] labor market." 23 4 Western has observed that criminal
populations are separated from the economic marketplace: indeed,
incarcerated men are "literally invisible because the penal population is
224. Tewksbury, supra note 222, at 76.
225. Id at 74.
226. Id at 75 ("Only 39.2% of registrants with child victims report that 90% or more of others in
their lives know of their registration/offenses, compared with 59.6% of registrants without child
victims.").
227. Id. at 78. There is a proposal to combine the doubly stigmatic labels of juvenile delinquent
and sex offender into a national juvenile sex offender registry, but opponents have pointed out that the
move would impose stigma, prevent social reintegration, and fail to improve public safety. See Mike
Cruz, Group Opposes Sex-Offender Registry for Youths, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2009.
228. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006).
229. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION (Univ. of Chi. Press 2009) (2007).
230. While Pager cites Link and Phelan, see id. at 147, she does not adopt their framework
explicitly.
231. Id. at 4 ("The 'credential' of a criminal record, like educational or professional credentials,
constitutes a formal and enduring classification of social status, which can be used to regulate access
and opportunity across numerous social, economic, and political domains.").
232. Id. at 38-39.
233. Id. at 101( "Racial stereotypes triggered by the appearance of a young black man (already
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omitted from the data sources used to track economic trends."235 We
therefore "mask a substantial component of persisting racial disparities by
'removing' the problem from our tracking systems." At the same time,
offenders are excluded from labor markets via legal mechanisms
(prohibitions on ex-felons in certain lines of work) and social mechanisms
(as a sign of "general disrepute").237 This downward spiral can lead to self-
reinforcing exclusion from the labor market, through the mechanisms of
stigma management.23 8 The ultimate result is that "incarceration is
associated with limited future employment opportunities and earnings
potential, which themselves are among the strongest predictors of
desistance from crime." 239 Ultimately, then, stigma reinforces criminality.
There are two aspects of the Link/Phelan stigma framework that are
thus particularly useful when returning to legal analysis. The first is the
degree of particularization of an individual: that is, whether the label is the
result of stereotyping or the result of a considered judgment. 2 40 The second
is the analysis of power: given that stigmatized groups are, perforce, those
without power, counter-majoritarian legal protections will be the only way
to keep regulation from spilling over into oppression.2 4 1
Some sex offenders are, undoubtedly, dangerous and incorrigible.
The issue is whether the state has to make this finding, or whether it can
235. WESTERN, supra note 228, at 87.
236. PAGER, supra note 229, at 30. This "counting" issue cuts another way, as well: for census
purposes, prisoners are generally counted as "residents" of the county where they are imprisoned, not
their county of (former) legal residence. The result is that political districts are drawn to include prison
populations-even though prisoners can't vote in almost every state-and the prisoners' "home"
districts are underrepresented politically. Eric Lotke & Pete Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral
and Financial Consequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24
PACE L. REv. 587, 588 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY FILE 3,
2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION, app. C at C-2 (2002)).
237. PAGER, supra note 229,at 33-35.
238. Id. at 147-48 (The stigmatized "may act less confidently and more defensively, or they may
simply avoid a potentially threatening contact altogether. The result may be strained and uncomfortable
social interactions with potential stigmatizers, more constricted social networks, a compromised quality
of life, low self-esteem, depressive symptoms, unemployment and income loss." (citing Link & Phelan,
supra note 144, at 374)).
239. PAGER, supra note 229, at 3.
240. For a discussion of myth versus risk in another context, see School Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). Arline concerned the dismissal of a teacher with tuberculosis. The Court
noted the danger that "public fear and misapprehension" about contagiousness would overcome
"reasoned and medically sound judgments" without the protection of the statute at issue. Id. at 284-85.
For that reason, it concluded, Congress sought to prevent "discrimination on the basis of mythology,"
since "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id.
241. Of course, criminals are not insular minorities in the traditional sense, but race and crime are
intermingled. See, e.g., WESTERN, supra note 228, at 3 (detailing the ways in which "African American
history has been entwined with the history of America's prisons"); see also id. at 6 (African Americans
"routinely contend[] with long terms of forced confinement and bear[] the stigma of official criminality
in all subsequent spheres of social life, as citizens, workers, and spouses. This is a profound social
exclusion that significantly rolls back the gains to citizenship hard won by the civil rights movement.").
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assume it. Saying "all sex offenders are dangerous" without differentiating
between them or meeting a high standard of proof unfairly and incorrectly
stereotypes. Deciding that a particular sex offender is dangerous is not
stereotyping. The difference between stereotyping and risk assessment has
to do with the quality of deliberation-ensuring that the stigma that attaches
itself to the term "sex offender" matches up to an individual's risk. This is
precisely what due process protections are designed to ensure.
III. Retributive Regulations
The issue with which I began this Article is whether we can or
should unify our approach to civil and criminal statutes, and, if so, how it
might be done.242 Currently courts use a mishmash of approaches, although
the Supreme Court appears to have settled on a two-step approach to SVP
cases: looking at the legislative label and then determining whether the civil
label is misapplied under the Mendoza-Martinez test.24 3 My approach is a
bit different. I suggest that courts look to the imposition of stigma and
adjust procedural protections accordingly.
Using stigma, not civil/criminal labels, to apportion due process
protections would, I believe, have some advantages over the current
approach. The flexibility of the due process standard, rather than the
rigidity of a rule, is well-suited to the problems at hand, since the balance
between the public interest in public safety and the individual interest in
avoiding confinement and stigma necessarily involves shades of gray. A
rule is bound to be over- and under-inclusive, excluding some punitive civil
laws and providing for the full weight of criminal procedure when the
protections would accomplish little.
Moreover, a focus on criminal and civil labels presumes that these
labels are, themselves, meaningful (or at least illustrative of) constitutional
values. Mendoza-Martinez still, in some ways, enshrines labels over
functions, and creates a threshold of all-or-nothing protection. The
taxonomy of statutes remains the central part of the Mendoza-Martinez
analysis-we focus on what statutes should be called, perhaps at the
expense of what they mean.244 The problem is that meaning changes
through usage, and the definition of whether something "should be called"
civil or criminal depends on how these laws are, in fact, labeled.245 And
even if a law stops short of being effectively punitive, it might nevertheless
restrict liberty and impose stigma in a way that necessitates some of the
242. See supra Part I.
243. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); see also Kansas v. Hendricks 521
U.S. 346 (1997).
244. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
245. This is akin, in some ways, to the debates about the meaning of "cruel and unusual" in the
Eighth Amendment. Is a practice necessarily neither cruel nor unusual if a majority of states does it, or
is there an inherent value enshrined in those words independent of popular usage (or practice)?
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protections of due process. It makes much more sense to talk about
individual liberties from the point of view of the individual, not the division
of government (or the part of the code) that is affecting her. Shifting the
discussion to these simple dimensions-liberty and stigma-allows us to
speak more meaningfully of the difference between incapacitating offenders
on the basis of risk or moral judgment. In short, it weeds out public safety
regulations from retributive regulations.
In suggesting that Winship govern our inquiry, I am actually not
suggesting something new, but rather a return to what once was. The
Supreme Court has already used Winship to analyze the due process
ramifications of formally civil laws, most notably in Addington v. Texas,246
a civil commitment case involving mental illness. 24 7  This example,
however, does more than demonstrate that deciding cases using Winship is
feasible; it also demonstrates that using Winship focuses us on the
substance of the deprivations at stake. It bears repeating that Winship was a
civil case involving the deprivation of liberty and the imposition of stigma
on the basis of predicate criminal behavior24 8 -jUSt like the SVP civil
commitment statutes at issue in Part I.
A. Winship Due Process: The Example of Addington v. Texas
Using Winship due process to analyze the protections due in civil
deprivations of liberty is something the Supreme Court has done before. In
this section, then, I am not so much proposing something new as suggesting
a return to something old.249 In Addington v. Texas, which dealt with civil
246. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
247. See id. at 432-33 ("To meet due process demands, the standard has to inform the factfinder
that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other
categories of civil cases."). However, "the reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil
commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a
burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment."
Id. at 432.
248. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 359-61.
249. The fact that Winship has been so extended on the civil side, and that it is a staple of criminal
procedure, should address any concerns that Winship is somehow an anomalous situation that cannot, or
should not, be extended to other areas of the law. I concede that Winship concerns juvenile proceedings
where the underlying behavior would be criminal if committed by an adult, id at 359, but this argues for
functionalism, not formalism. Indeed, the issue of how to characterize juvenile proceedings has long
puzzled courts, leading Justice Blackmun to conclude, "Little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt
simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either 'civil' or 'criminal."' McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971) (holding that a trial by jury is not required in juvenile
delinquency proceedings). This is not to say that the issues are not important; they are. Juveniles often
find themselves in limbo, caught between categories, when a substantive analysis of the issues at stake
would be better suited to resolving them. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, A Killer at 16, and Still in
California's Juvenile Justice System Decades Later, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A14 (reporting that a
thirty-seven-year-old man remains in California's juvenile justice system, beyond the normal maximum
age of twenty-five; because he was "convicted as a juvenile and continue[s] to be held under the mental
health code, he cannot be transferred to an adult facility").
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commitments of the mentally ill 2 50 and, later, Santosky v. Kramer,251 which
concerned the termination of parental rights,252 the Court did not decide that
either of the statutes under examination was, in essence, criminal. Instead,
it looked to the liberty interests at stake and found that due process required
the facts at issue to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 25 3 This
functional approach has a ready analogue in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. There, because the Eighth Amendment is not textually
limited to criminal cases,254 the question is not whether a statutory penalty
is "civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment." 255
Addington applied Winship to find that the state had to prove future
dangerousness of a mentally ill person by a standard of proof greater than a
preponderance of the evidence.256 Because the stigma and liberty issues at
stake were not identical to those in Winship, however, the state did not need
to prove its claims by Winship's beyond a reasonable doubt standard; clear
and convincing evidence was sufficient.257 Addington was arrested on a
misdemeanor assault charge against his mother when she filed a petition to
have him civilly committed.25 8 Addington had a long history of being
committed to mental hospitals 259 and had been assaultive while in the
hospital; he was therefore "probably dangerous" in the opinions of two
psychiatric experts.2 60  Addington conceded his mental illness, but
challenged the dangerousness finding, 261 arguing that "any standard of
proof for commitment less than that required for criminal convictions, i.e.
beyond a reasonable doubt, violated his procedural due process rights."262
The Supreme Court looked at Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Winship, which examined the ways in which standards of proof allocate risk
of error and "indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision." 263 Because society has a "minimal" concern in the outcome of a
typical civil case, preponderance of the evidence is sufficient, while the
250. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
251. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
252. See id. at 768-69 (using Addington to require clear and convincing evidence of parental
neglect in proceedings to terminate parental rights).
253. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768.
254. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 (1993) (applying the Eighth
Amendment's excessive fines clause to civil forfeiture claims).
255. Id. at 610 ("The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the
division between the civil and the criminal law.... It is commonly understood that civil proceedings
may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals
may be served by criminal penalties." (internal citations omitted)).
256. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.
257. Id. at 427-28.
258. Id. at 420.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 420-21.
261. Id. at 421.
262. Id. at 421-22.
263. Id. at 423 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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defendant's interests in a criminal case are of "such magnitude that . .. our
society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself."264 The clear and
convincing standard is appropriate for cases where the interests are greater
than "mere loss of money" but where it is nevertheless appropriate to
"reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished." 2 65 The
Court found that there were, indeed, "adverse social consequences" to a
civil commitment, and that "[w]hether we label this phenomena [sic]
'stigma' or choose to call it something else is less important than that we
recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on
the individual." 26 6
Addington distinguished civil commitments from the juvenile
adjudication in Winship, finding "no meaningful distinctions" between
criminal adult trials and juvenile commitments, 2 67 and argued that a civil
commitment "can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution"2 68 (even
though much of the evidence about Addington's dangerousness came from
his criminal history of assaults). The beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof was not required in the civil commitment case because the "layers
of professional review . . . and the concern of family and friends generally
will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be
corrected." 26 9  Finally, the Court noted that issues about future
dangerousness were necessarily more speculative than the retrospective
questions in either criminal prosecutions or delinquency proceedings. The
latter proceedings involve "a straightforward factual question-did the
accused commit the act alleged?" 270 In commitment proceedings, facts are
just the starting point: the real issue is about whether these facts mean that
someone is both mentally ill and dangerous, and "there is a serious question
whether a state could ever prove [this] beyond a reasonable doubt." 27 1
Justice Stevens, Apprendi's author, has himself suggested in a
series of dissents that stigma gives rise to procedural protections for sex
offender civil commitments. In Allen v. Illinois,27 2 Stevens dissented from
the majority's holding that an SVP law was civil,2 7 3 writing that a civil label
"cannot change the character of a criminal proceeding." 2 74 What mattered,
264. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24.
265. Id. at 424.
266. Id. at 425-26.
267. Id at 428. I disagree with this characterization, see supra note 157 and accompanying text,
but it does not affect whether Winship's general framework is applicable to formally civil cases, as
Addington itself demonstrates.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 428-29.
270. Id. at 429.
271. Id.
272. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
273. See id. at 368 (holding that SVP law's civil nature meant use of defendant's statements in
therapy were not barred by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
274. Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ultimately, was that "the stigma associated with an adjudication as a
'sexually dangerous person' is at least as great as that associated with most
criminal convictions." 275  Even if a state declared that the goal of a
conventional criminal statute was "treatment" and "rehabilitation," the
procedural protections of the Fifth Amendment-due process-would still
apply.2 7 6 If labels were all that mattered, "nothing would prevent a State
from creating an entire corpus of 'dangerous person' statutes to shadow its
criminal code."2 77 That is, any statute could be rewritten so its "goal would
be 'treatment'; the result would be evisceration of criminal law and its
accompanying protections."2 78
Justice Stevens was also the lone dissenter in Seling, which rejected
an as-applied challenge to an SVP law, arguing that "the question whether a
statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to
the text of the statute."279 Conditions of confinement were "evidence of
both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect."2 80
Stevens also dissented to the sex offender registry law in Doe, writing
separately that he thought the law was criminal because it restricted liberty
and imposed "severe stigma."281
B. The Mendoza-Martinez Approach
Recent cases from the Supreme Courts of Kentucky 2 82 and Maine283
used the Mendoza-Martinez approach to find that formally civil sex
offender residency restrictions were "so punitive in effect as to negate any
intention to deem them civil," holding that their retroactive application
violated the ex post facto clause of the United States and state
284 TeS
constitutions. The Supreme Court of Indiana also held a sex offender
registration statute unconstitutional under the Indiana constitution's Ex Post
Facto clause, again using Mendoza-Martinez 285
275. Id. at 377.
276. Id. at 380.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 275 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280. Id.; see also Eric S. Janus & Brad Bolin, An End-Game for Sexually Violent Predator Laws:
As-Applied Invalidation, 6 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 25, 38 (2008) (noting that a law might escape a facial
challenge because it is drafted the right way, but an impermissible purpose-"the extra-legal
punishment of sex offenders, cannot be judicially discerned until it is implemented." (emphasis in
original)). These arguments have merit-the Seling majority did not convincingly explain how a
legislature could be duped by an executive bent on implementing a civil law in a punitive fashion
without at least the legislature's tacit consent.
281. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 111 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 112 (noting
that the widespread access to information "has a severe stigmatizing effect.").
282. Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009).
283. State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009).
284. Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 439; see also Letalien, 985 A.2d at 26-27.
285. Wallace v. Indiana, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009).
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In this section, however, I will focus on People v. Mosley,286 a case
from the California Court of Appeal, which used Mendoza-Martinez to
determine that a sex offender registry was punitive, and from there held that
Apprendi required the factual findings justifying placement on the registry
to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 287 Because the statute at
issue, which stiffened residency restrictions on sex offenders after their
release from prison, "increase[d] the penalty for the underlying offense
beyond the statutory maximum," the judicial fact finding used to impose
these restrictions violated Apprendi.288  Mosley is instructive not only
because it considers Apprendi in light of civil restrictions, but also because
it cites the Apprendi definition of punishment highlighted in this Article:
that punishment means "both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to
the offense." 2 89
Mosley was acquitted of a sex offense but was nevertheless
required to register as a sex offender and comply with the residency
restrictions that attached. 290 The judge who ordered registration second-
guessed the jury's acquittal on the charge of sexual assault, opining: "We
simply don't know what the jury-why the jury acquitted the defendant." 2 91
He then made his own finding that "the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant sexually assaulted the victim" 292 and
that the assault was committed "as a result of sexual compulsion or for
purposes of sexual gratification." 2 9 3 The California statute gave the judge
discretion to impose residency restrictions for "any offense . .. if the court
finds . . . that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual
compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. . . even if the defendant
was not convicted of a sexual offense."2 94
The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction (for non-sexual
assault) but reversed the residency requirement. 295 Although registration
had been deemed civil by the California Supreme Court,296 the new burdens
imposed by Jessica's Law (passed in 2006 as Proposition 83)297 changed the
calculation.298 The California court used the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
decide whether the new registration law as modified in 2006 was punitive,
286. 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2008).
287. Id. at 38-39.
288. Id at 34 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
289. Id. at 31 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484).
290. Id. at 24.
291. Id. at 27.
292. Id.
293. Id
294. Id at 27 n.3.
295. Id. at 24-25.
296. Id at 29.
297. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West 2006).
298. Mosley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 30.
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and thus whether Apprendi applied.299 Factors indicating that the law was
punitive were the "heavy affirmative restraint" of the residency
restriction,3 00 the similarity to the traditional punishment of banishment,30'
the aim of deterring recidivism-one of the traditional aims of
punishment,3 02 -and the law's overbroad application to all sex offenders,
even those whose offenses did not involve children.303 Civil factors were
the law's express statement of no punitive intent304 and the rational
connection to the nonpunitive purpose of protecting children. 30' The Court
of Appeal concluded that the law had an "overwhelming punitive effect." 3 06
C. Comparing the Mendoza-Martinez and Winship Approaches
The Mendoza-Martinez cases prove that it is at least possible to
find some limits on the civil label. However, these cases arrive at
protections in an odd sort of all-or-nothing manner. They find that the civil
laws are effectively criminal, and then apply all of the protections of
criminal procedure to them.307 Looked at another way, in evaluating
whether a given statute is criminal, Mendoza-Martinez is also defining
punishment. The question then becomes how well it does that. Some of
Mendoza-Martinez's tests determine whether the law should have been put
into a different part of the code (e.g., is the behavior criminal and has it
historically been criminal),30s while other parts of the test look to the
function of the law (does it involve an affirmative disability or restraint,
does it involve culpability (scienter)).30 9 At best, Mendoza-Martinez
identifies some of the substantive issues in criminal law and some of the
features of statutes legislatures have labeled criminal, but it does not
identify all of them in either category.
A Winship/due process test would provide a substantive-and
simpler-definition of punishment: the stigmatic deprivation of liberty. It
could also scale its protections to the degree of deprivations involved.
Restrictions exist on a continuum and could be met with procedural
protections along the same continuum. Thus, even if a civil restriction were
stigmatic, all of Apprendi's protections-and those of the rest of criminal
299. Id. at 35-36; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(finding the Alaska sex offender registry "punitive in effect" using the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
300. Mosley, 86 Cal. Rptr.3d 36.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 37.
303. Id
304. Id. at 35.
305. Id. at 37.
306. Id. at 38.
307. See supra Part IIIB.
308. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
309. Id.
1572011]
HeinOnline  -- 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 157 2010-2011
AM. J. CRIM. L.
procedure-would not necessarily apply. Protections would be tailored to
individual unfairnesses.
States have, in fact, already put a variety of procedural protections
in their SVP commitment statutes. 310 Four states (Arizona, Iowa, Kansas,
and South Carolina) require a full complement of procedural protections:
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, finding by a jury, right to counsel, right to
appeal, hearing before a judge, and annual review where the state bears the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that continued confinement is
justified.3 1 1 Five states have all but one of the above protections:
Washington, California, and Massachusetts are missing only the right to
appeal, Illinois provides for a clear and convincing standard to justify
continued confinement, and Texas provides for biennial, not annual,
review. 3 12 Three other states provide for a lower standard of proof on the
initial confinement: Florida, Missouri, and New York.3 13
Due process, then, would not provide courts with the same answer
to all statutes that provide for the civil commitment of SVPs; it would give
different answers tailored to the different statutes. But, as Addington
demonstrates, a court's analysis of all the factors involved is also useful to
explain why we have the rules we have. That is, Addington does more than
just decide a particular case: it also educates those who read it about the
values of due process, not simply through the personal whim of the judges
involved, but through a close analysis of the actual interests involved, both
on the state's side and the individual's side.
The addition of stigma to the equation means that the due process
analysis would have to take notice that labels can be both inaccurate and
incredibly debilitating. It's not simply the case that a civil commitment
SVP law (as in Hendricks) is only about a restriction on liberty; the SVP
law also imposes a stigmatic label. It's also not simply the case that a sex
offender registry (as in Doe) deserves less scrutiny due to its lesser effects
on liberty; its stigmatic effects are profound. The expanded understanding
of stigma the Link/Phelan framework provides us underscores the very real
consequences that come from having to register 314 -So it does not matter if
310. For an overview of the state SVP commitment statutes, see Appendix, infra.
311. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3717 (2009); IOWA CODE §§ 229A.1-16
(2009); KAN STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-922 (2005 & Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to 170
(2002 & Supp. 2010).
312. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 2010); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
207/60(d) (2008) (providing that a petition for conditional release must be granted unless the State
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person has not made sufficient progress for release);
MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1-16 (2003 & Supp. 2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
841.101-03 (West 2010) (providing for biennial review of civil commitment orders); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 71.09.10-903 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
313. FLA. STAT. § 394.917(1) (2006) (establishing a clear and convincing evidence standard for
confinement); Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.495(1) (2006) (same); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d)
(McKinney Supp. 2011) (same).
314. See supra Part II.C.
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these effects are deemed "collateral" or "incidental" as long as the
imposition of their very real bite is done more carefully, with proper
procedural protections. Stigma, then, is not merely a quaint holdover from
the "death before dishonor" days; even today, when social mores are
perhaps less rigorously enforced than before, we can use the Link/Phelan
framework to help decide when something is simply unflattering and when
- 315it becomes stigmatic.
Given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, it is difficult to say
what a given result might be if an SVP civil commitment statute, for
example, were analyzed using due process. SVP laws are different in each
state that has them, employing different procedures (e.g., jury, cross-
examination), providing for different durations of confinement, and even
providing for different standards of proof.3 16 At least three state courts have
used due process to analyze the level of protection required in SVP statutes,
but, again, generalizations are difficult to come by, given the variety of
procedures used.3 17 The point here, though, is to underscore that stigma is
an important liberty interest in itself. Procedures need to protect not only
wrongful confinement, but also wrongful imposition of stigma. Due
process can separate stigmatic judgments-that is, condemnatory ones
based on stereotypical labels-from analyses of risk. A higher standard of
proof can been seen as a way to put stigmatic presumptions to the test, to
make them more particularly related to the very real public safety interests
they are designed to protect, while ensuring they are not simply expressions
of fear.318 In other words, we need to make sure that the sanctions we
315. Consider another paradigmatic civil restraint based on criminal activity: domestic violence
based temporary restraining orders (TROs) barring an abuser from coming near his or her victim.
Liberty and stigma are affected by these orders, but we can see how a one-size-fits-all approach would
not, in fact, be able to fit a Hendricks situation, a Doe situation, and a TRO situation. This illustrates a
key advantage to using due process analysis: that it is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
316. For an overview of the state SVP commitment statutes, see Appendix, infra.
317. See, e.g., People v. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr.3d 661 (Cal. Ct, App. 4th Dist. 2008) (concluding,
on the issue of first impression, that Addington does not apply to SVP commitment, and therefore
dangerousness need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence); see also Washington v. Stout, 159
N.W.2d 357, 369-70 (2007) (rejecting claim that due process requires confrontation in SVP context).
The Missouri Supreme Court recently rejected a challenge to an SVP statute which required a clear and
convincing standard of proof; petitioners had argued that beyond a reasonable doubt was required. In re
van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 584-85 (Mo. 2008).
318. Courts might also want to use the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), due process
framework, which provides a more detailed algorithm than Winship. Under Eldridge, due process
inquiries must examine:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id. at 335. Private interests here would include both stigma and restrictions on liberty, erroneous
deprivations would be addressed by making findings more particular, and all of these would be weighed
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impose actually make us safer. Categories of offender do not threaten
public safety, individual offenders do.
I realize that an obvious realist critique is that the real problem has
nothing to do with standards and everything to do with judges'
unwillingness to strike down popular laws aimed at extremely unpopular
subsections of the population. Arguing that courts must consider liberty
deprivation and stigma imposition won't get the job done by itself.3 19 In
fact, the due process analysis of Doe's statute would probably not look that
different from Justice Ginsburg's Mendoza-Martinez-based dissent,3 20 and
the Indiana Supreme Court incorporated stigma into the Mendoza-Martinez
"affirmative disability or restraint" prong.32 1
Nevertheless, I believe that using Winship still has some benefits.
It explains what is being protected, why it needs protection, and how it
should be protected more than a simple "mislabeling" test does. In other
words, I can accept both that courts will find violations of due process only
in the breach (and even then, only rarely), and that most of the procedural
protections that result will come not from courts' interventions but from
legislative design, but still maintain that the choice of a Winship standard
would have some benefits. Even if the outcomes of courts' decisions do not
change (much), using a rubric which more clearly identifies the interests at
stake will benefit whatever civic conversation surrounds decisions about
procedure. Focusing on civil and criminal labels pushes the conversation
towards categories, towards deciding what a statute is called and whether
that label is accurate. Focusing on liberty and stigma pushes the
conversation towards what the statute does and how it affects important
individual interests. Focusing on these effects has a better chance of
generating procedures that protect these interests; focusing on labeling (or
relabeling) is more likely to promote compliance with formal categories,
whether or not those categories map onto the interests they purport to
reflect.
against the government's substantial interest in preventing future harms.
319. Indeed, the ineffectiveness of due process to protect rights at parole was the subject of my
earlier Article. There, however, the problem was not so much the standard as the way in which it was
applied. See generally Ball, supra note 11.
320. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Doe, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
321. See Wallace v. Indiana, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind. 2009) ("[T]he act imposes significant
affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom it applies."); see also id at 380
("[T]he Act exposes registrants to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism. Further the
practical effect of this dissemination is that it often subjects offenders to 'vigilante justice' which may
include lost employment opportunities, housing discrimination, threats, and violence."). A concurrence
to the Maine Supreme Court's sex offender ruling would use "the additional factor of stigma" alongside
the Mendoza-Martinez factors. State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 30-1 (Me. 2009) (Silver, J., concurring)
(arguing that the stigma associated with registration renders the statute punitive).
160 [Vol. 38:2
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IV. Public Safety Punishments
I have argued that the presence or absence of stigma determines
what procedural protections should apply to nominally civil laws, and in so
doing have focused on the Winship portion of Apprendi's rule. I now turn
to the jury portion of Apprendi's rule, and examine statutes with criminal
labels. If, as I have argued, some civil penalties might be sufficiently
"criminal" to require more due process protection, are there criminal
penalties that are sufficiently "civil" to require less procedural protection-
and, more specifically, can these criminal penalties be based on facts not
found by juries?
Drawing on the institutional competence analysis I provided in my
earlier article, where I argued that juries serve as moral experts and
nonjuries serve as public safety experts,322 I will again argue that juries are
required only for retributive sanctions, not those which sound in public
safety. Juries must decide questions with factual dimensions bearing on
wrongfulness, while nonjuries can decide everything else. Juries are the
conscience of the community, and when the purpose of a given sentence is
punitive-a deprivation of liberty with the stigma of wrongdoing-a jury
needs to find it. Judges and other bodies, on the other hand, have repeat-
player expertise about how to treat offenders in order to maximize public
safety. They need access to all relevant information to determine how best
a given offender can best be rehabilitated or quarantined. Because
nonjuries have neither special moral expertise nor greater moral standing,
they may not find facts leading to greater opprobrium.
The presence or absence of stigma here, then, is not a liberty
interest deserving of due process protections itself (as in Part II), but a way
of asking whether the criminal penalties address risk or desert-whether
they are either retributive sanctions or what I will call public safety
punishments. Public safety punishments are a kind of hybrid of retribution
and regulation, sanctions based on predicate criminal behavior which serve
only to quarantine. The presence or absence of stigma indicates the
category of a given sanction: the presence of stigma indicates some kind of
moral judgment, which makes a sanction punitive, while the absence of
stigma indicates that what we are doing is truly regulatory.
In this Part, I will first analyze the recent decision Oregon v. Ice,
which held that judges could find facts justifying the imposition of
consecutive sentences.323 I aim to demonstrate how the law in Ice might
have been read to incorporate non-retributive, public safety concerns about
future dangerousness, thus avoiding the need for jury involvement without
tearing at the fabric of the Apprendi line. I will then point out some
322. Ball, supra note 11, at 922-31.
323. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
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problems with the division between risk and desert: the ways in which
criminal law treats extreme risks in moral terms, and the ways in which the
interdependence of civil and criminal penalties means that the imposition of
stigma often has neither a clear first cause nor a clear last cause.
A. Cracking Ice: Using Public Safety to Decode the Meaning of
Consecutive Sentencing
In Oregon v. Ice, Justice Ginsburg sought to limit Apprendi by
relying on two factors outside the doctrine: the need for legislative
deference and the fact that judges have historically had the power to impose
sentences consecutively. 324 As Part I demonstrates, legislative deference is
a rule that provides few limits, particularly given the inconsistent-or
incoherent-way in which it has been applied. The history of the judicial
power has also changed as a result of judicial decisions, exemplified by
Apprendi itself. In this section, I argue that the Oregon statute at issue in
Ice could instead have sanctioned judicial fact-finding within Apprendi by
focusing on future dangerousness. This distinction would have served to
prevent the state from imposing punishment without procedural protections
while limiting Apprendi in a manner more consistent with the rest of the
doctrine.
1. Ice and the Search for an Administrable Boundary
Thomas Ice twice entered a unit of the apartment building he
managed and sexually assaulted an eleven-year-old girl.325 He was
convicted of six crimes: two counts of first-degree burglary (entering with
the intent to commit sexual abuse), two counts of first-degree sexual assault
for touching the victim's vagina, and two counts of first-degree sexual
assault for touching her breasts.326
The Oregon law governing sentencing presumes that sentences will
be imposed concurrently for offenses that are part of the "same continuous
and uninterrupted course of conduct." 327 The judge can, however, impose
consecutive sentences for the same course of conduct if she finds either:
"(a) That the criminal offense . . . was an indication of defendant's
willingness to commit more than one criminal offense; or (b) The criminal
offense . . . caused or created a risk of causing greater or qualitatively
324. See id. at 717 (noting that "twin considerations-historical practice and respect for state
sovereignty--counsel against adopting the Apprendi rule for the imposition of sentences for discrete
crimes.").
325. Id. at 715.
3 2 6. Id.
327. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.123(1) and (2) (2007)) (noting that sentences "shall run
concurrently" unless the judge find certain statutorily described facts).
162 [Vol. 38:2
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different loss, injury or harm to the victim or . .. to a different victim." 3 2 8 If
a judge finds that the offenses of conviction were different events, the
concurrent sentencing presumption does not apply, and she retains the
authority to sentence consecutively. 329
At sentencing, Ice's judge found that each count of burglary was a
separate incident, allowing him to impose consecutive sentences for each
count.3 30 Given that each sexual assault was part of a continuous course of
conduct (the burglary), he could not sentence Ice to consecutive sentences
for the sexual assault counts unless he also found evidence that the
defendant was both "willing[] to commit more than one . . . offense" and
that his conduct "caused or created a risk of causing greater, qualitatively
different loss, injury, or harm to the victim."33 1 He did make this finding,
which gave him the authority to sentence Ice to consecutive sentences for
the sexual assaults he committed during each burglary.33 2 The judge
ultimately sentenced Ice consecutively on four charges (all except those for
touching the victim's breasts). On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that Ice's consecutive sentences violated Apprendi because they were
based on judicial findings of fact. 334
The issue of whether to apply Apprendi depends on whether these
findings of fact increased Ice's statutory maximum punishment. As stated
earlier in Part I, Blakely defines the statutory maximum as the presumptive
sentence that can be imposed based on the jury's verdict or the plea.335 In
Oregon, the presumptive sentence was concurrent; only upon an additional
finding of fact could a judge impose a consecutive sentence.336 This means
that the practice violated Apprendi because the facts increased the
maximum punishment without a jury finding them beyond a reasonable
doubt.337
The United States Supreme Court reversed, however,
328. Id (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123(5) (2007)).
329. Id (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123(2) (2007)).
330. Id at 715-16
331. Id at 716 (ellipsis in original, internal citations omitted). Somewhat confusingly, the phrase
used here, "willingness to commit more than one offense," goes to the offender's blameworthy mens
rea, not his propensity for future dangerousness. In other words, the phrase means the defendant





335. See Ball, supra note I1, at 950 ("[T]he Supreme Court defined the statutory maximum as the
presumptive sentence for a given set of facts, not the maximum sentence under which the offender is
charged.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 951 ("Pleading guilty to the presumptive crime is not the
same as pleading guilty to the aggravated version of that crime, even if the taxonomic maximum
sentence the legislature calls kidnapping is greater than either.") (emphasis added).
336. See Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 715.
337. See State v. Ice, 170 P.3d 1049, 1058 (Or. 2007) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466,494 (2000)).
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distinguishing between an increase in punishment for a particular offense
and the imposition of multiple sentences.33 8 Justice Ginsburg's opinion did
not announce that it was overruling Apprendi; instead it argued that because
Ice's sentencing judge did not increase the maximum punishment for any
individual sentence, the fact that his total time in prison increased was
irrelevant.339 (I note that Apprendi itself raised and dismissed the issue of
consecutive versus concurrent sentences, 340 that which went unmentioned in
the Ice majority.)
Justice Ginsburg's opinion reinserted legislative deference into the
criminal realm. 34 1  Because the power to specify how a judge may
administer "multiple sentences has long been considered the prerogative of
state legislatures,"34 2 it "goes without saying that preventing and dealing
with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal
Government." 34 3
Justice Ginsburg argued that the decision to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences is not part of the jury's "traditional domain," but is
instead part of "the prerogative of state legislatures." 3 " For support, she
cited Patterson v. New York,345 a case that Apprendi probably overruled346
and which had not been cited in years.347 Because Oregon's law gave Ice
more procedural protection than he would have enjoyed historically
(because judges used to have wide-ranging discretion to sentence
consecutively), Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court should be reluctant
338. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 714-15.
339. See id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Ice majority "attempts to distinguish
Oregon's sentencing scheme by reasoning that the rule of Apprendi applies only to the length of a
sentence for an individual crime and not to the total sentence for a defendant.").
340. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000). The defendant in Apprendi could have
been sentenced consecutively for the three charges to which he pleaded guilty. Id. The time he served
would have totaled more than twenty years, id at 470, far greater than the twelve years to which he was
eventually sentenced. Id. at 471. Apprendi got an enhanced sentence on just one of his charges, and
that sentence was increased because of a finding that he acted with racial animus. Id. The key here,
again, is not just time, but the moral opprobrium attached to it. Sentence time tells you something about
punishment, but not everything. After all, Justice Thomas has said repeatedly in the civil context that
detention is not a synonym for punishment. See supra note 198. In Charles Apprendi's case, the
judge's finding made his crime more stigmatic and it increased the time he would spend in prison. Both
of these factors, however, were necessary constituents of his increased punishment. Ball, supra note 11,
at 925-26.
341. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 717 (majority opinion) (noting that "our opinions make clear that the Sixth
Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury's traditional domain.").
342. Id.
343. Id. at 718 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977)).
344. Id. at 717 (noting that this power to specify how a judge may administer "multiple sentences
has long been considered the prerogative of state legislatures.").
345. Id. at 717 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977)).
346. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning why Apprendi's rule
"would not require the overruling of Patterson").
347. Patterson is not mentioned in Blakely, Booker, or Cunningham, and gets only a brief
mention in Justice O'Connor's Ring dissent. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619 (2002) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Apprendi rule contradicts the holding of Patterson).
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to thwart the will of the legislature.348 Because Ice had no "entitlement" to
a lesser sentence, again referring to the "historical role of the jury at
common law,"3 49 there was no constitutional violation. In other words,
because the legislature labeled a given fact a consecutive/concurrent
sentencing factor, not an element of an aggravated crime, its effects were
irrelevant and Apprendi did not apply.
Justice Scalia, dissenting, was understandably bewildered by the
majority's reliance on "artificial limitations" on Apprendi.3 50 Apprendi's
"guarantee turns upon the penal consequences attached to the fact, and not
to its formal definition as an element of the crime." 51 If an increase in
punishment turns on the finding of a fact, "that fact-no matter how the
State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."3 5 2
The rule "leaves no room for a formalistic distinction between facts bearing
on the number of years of imprisonment that a defendant will serve for one
count (subject to the rule of Apprendi) and facts bearing on how many years
will be served in total (now not subject to Apprendi)."353 Ultimately, he
argued, legislative deference only goes so far. "The right to trial by jury
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a given, and all legislative
policymaking-good and bad, heartless and compassionate-must work
within the confines of that reality." 354
2. The Limits of Justice Ginsburg's Approach
The ultimate problem Justice Ginsburg appeared to be trying to
address is how to draw clear boundaries around Apprendi's rule. She
argued that the line should remain where she thinks it is-excluding it from
any new applications-because ruling otherwise would disturb so much of
contemporary state judicial practice. In support, she cited examples
where judicial fact finding led to dispositional departures, such as decisions
about post-release supervision, drug rehabilitation, and fines.356 Because
there was no rule she could find that would limit Apprendi's "expansion" to
these circumstances, she concluded that courts should defer to legislative
policymaking. While Justice Ginsburg noted that "not every state
initiative will be in harmony with Sixth Amendment ideals," we are left
348. See ke, 129 S. Ct. at 718.
349. Id. ("It is no answer that, as Ice argues, 'he was "entitled' to' concurrent sentences absent
the fact findings Oregon law requires." (emphasis in original)).
350. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351. Id
352. Id (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 722 (emphasis in original).
355. Id. at 718-19.
356. Id at 719 (majority opinion).
357. Id
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with no idea what might distinguish an Apprendi violation from an
acceptable law.3ss Because Oregon's law was not an example of legislative
"manipulation," the Court did not provide a rule to distinguish between
deferring to sound policy and tacitly approving of unconstitutional
legislation.359
If institutional and policy concerns were to demarcate the limits of
the Apprendi rule, however, Apprendi itself would not survive Ice's
interpretation of it. Before Apprendi, judges had great discretion to find
facts which determined sentences, and the legislatures who created sentence
enhancements made it equally clear that they wanted judges to find facts
and sentence offenders based on those facts.36 o
Without a unifying theory, then, it is difficult to draw the
boundaries of the Apprendi rule. The "jury as bulwark" theory is a black
box. These are the rules, and we follow them, Justice Ginsburg says, unless
the state legislature (and our reading of history) says otherwise. Justice
Ginsburg cannot explain why Apprendi would or would not extend to fines
or drug treatment; she can only say that if it did, it would invalidate a great
deal of state practice that the court should be reluctant to throw out. She
cannot provide reasoning internal to Apprendi's rule that would limit its
application, but instead must look to other principles to balance against it.
The principle Justice Ginsburg offered, whether the practice has
"traditionally belonged to the jury," " presumes that Apprendi is about
institutions and phases of trials-that it is about forms, not functions. The
Ice majority might have been right if Apprendi were concerned only with
the roles the players play, not the reasons those roles are important. Under
this view, it makes sense to talk about reining in the "wooden, unyielding
insistence on expanding the Apprendi doctrine far beyond its necessary
boundaries," because there is no "principled rationale" involved.362
Without some animating principle behind Apprendi, it is easy to discount its
importance and see it simply as a pointless hoop through which the
legislature needs to jump.363
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 562 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
"under traditional sentencing law . . . legislation, silent as to sentencing factors, grant[ed] the judge
virtually unchecked discretion to sentence within a broad range.").
361. Ice, 129 S.Ct. at 719.
362. Id. (citing Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
363. This is, I think, where courts are in the area of their greatest expertise-not as taskmasters
who leave us only to ask "how high" when they say "jump", but as a kind of deliberative or narrative
body that helps explain policies and principles. Courts, in other words, need to convince and explain,
not simply to issue orders. Even if courts ultimately overturn some statutes, they can do so in a way that
ultimately strengthens legislative choices-by making them more meaningful (or more sincere). This
transparency can extend beyond mere policy choices to deeper issues concerning the nature of justice in
society at large. See Kenneth Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy
of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L.
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Apprendi is more than just a wooden rule, however, and judicial
discussion of the interests identified in Winship and Apprendi would make
that clear. I will now propose an alternative reading for the statute in Ice
that could have preserved a judge's ability to sentence consecutively, but
only when she is acting in her area of greatest institutional competence:
public safety.
3. A Public Safety Reading of the Ice Statute
The statute at issue in Ice provides that a judge may impose
consecutive sentences if she finds that the offenses of conviction were not a
part of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, or if she finds that
the offenses "caused or created a risk of causing greater or qualitatively
different loss, injury or harm to the victim or . . . to a different victim."
There are thus three conditions under which the statute might apply.
The first condition-whether the convictions were part of the same
course of conduct-addresses Blockburger/double jeopardy concerns. 3 65 If
a prosecutor has duplicatively charged the same behavior, sentences are
served concurrently and the offender effectively serves time only for the
offense with the greatest penalty attached to it, not all of the effectively
"lesser included" offenses with which he was (over)charged. The second
condition is purely retributive. A judge can sentence an offender to serve
sentences consecutively-even when she cannot find that the charged
offenses arose from discrete events-when she finds that the offense facts
caused or increased the risk of greater harm to "the victim." 366 This finding
about the offense and its wrongfulness is retrospective 3 67 and clearly allows
the judge to find facts about the severity of the instant offense. The judge is
stepping on the jury's territory when she finds these facts.
But what to make of the third condition, the phrase "or to a
different victim?"36 8 Eliminating wording about "the" victim gives us this
condition under which a judge may impose consecutive sentences: when
she finds that the offenses "caused or created a risk of causing greater or
REv. 247, 312 (2000) ("Law is made undemocratic in a step-by-step process that reduces each complex
struggle to a formal contest over a rule.... Legal meaning, and therefore, legal power is contested, and
should be produced on that basis.").
364. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 715 (internal citations omitted).
365. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (holding that the government may
prosecute an individual for more than one offense stemming from a single course of conduct only when
each offense requires proof of an element that the other offenses do not require).
366. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 715.
367. Arguably, the finding about separate offenses is also retributive: the offender deserves more
punishment based on mens rea or attempt liability (or however else one might describe the reasoning
behind "a willingness to commit more than one offense" that was not, in fact, charged and found. Id. at
716) (internal citations and alterations omitted).
368. Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 715 (alterations omitted).
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qualitatively different loss, injury or harm to . .. a different victim." 69 This
presents a third alternative reading of the statute-one that is concerned not
with punishment for this crime, but with guarding against the risk of future
dangerousness. A judge can find facts about the instant offense provided
she uses them not to punish, but as evidence for future dangerousness-the
way criminal history is used as evidence of danger, not justification for
punishment, in civil commitment proceedings.3o
Under this reading, a judge would not be making any retributive
findings: she would not change the number of crimes of which a defendant
were convicted, nor would she make any findings of fact that made any
crime a more aggravated version of the offense. Her decision would sound
in public safety and would use facts to apply the appropriate "treatment" for
the offender, a practice in line with the medical model of sentencing
typified by Williams v. New York.371 The reason Apprendi would not apply,
then, is because the defendant was not punished more by the imposition of
consecutive sentences. The judge's fact finding would not increase the
stigma related to any individual offense; instead, the sentences would be
imposed for reasons of public safety.
B. Risk and Retribution
The issue of public safety punishments is not merely an interesting
anomaly at the fringes of criminal law: the issue of risk is embedded in
criminal law. Consider, for example, the depraved-heart murder doctrine.
Homicides that are the result of substantial and unjustifiable risk-taking are
generally punished as voluntary manslaughter. But, in some extreme
circumstances when the risk-taking is so substantial (or even so
369. Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
370. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (showing that past behavior is
just evidence of future dangerousness). I note also that the puzzle presented by Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that prior convictions need not be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt) involves the same problem: does the stiffer sentence given to those with prior
criminal convictions sound in greater punishment or a greater threat to public safety? See Ball, supra
note 11, at 930 n.215 (discussing whether recidivism is a measure of punishment or evidence of
dangerousness).
371. 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (using judge-found facts of uncharged criminal behavior as justification
for a death sentence does not violate due process). For a longer discussion of this point, see Ball, supra
note I1, at 926-27; see also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Specht is a civil commitment
case that cited Williams for the proposition that individualized treatment requires information that might
otherwise be excluded by the protections of criminal procedure such as cross-examination. Specht, 386
U.S. at 606-07. Specht held that the civil commitment procedure at issue violated due process:
The Sex Offenders Act does not make the commission of a specified crime the
basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for commencing another
proceeding under another Act to determine whether a person constitutes a threat
of bodily harm to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill. That is a
new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged.
Id. at 608 (internal citations omitted).
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unjustified), malice can be implied and murder found.3 72 In these extreme
circumstances, risk generates culpability. The ways in which this operates
are unclear, however. Even the American Law Institute, in its notes to the
Model Penal Code, states that the line between voluntary manslaughter and
depraved-heart murder cannot be drawn with any precision, but must
instead be left to the jury: "Whether recklessness is so extreme that it
demonstrates [extreme indifference to the value of human life] is not a
question, it is submitted, that can be further clarified. It must be left directly
to the trier of fact . . . . These examples suggest that, at some level,
danger is stigmatic.
Danger is often associated with what seem to be moral judgments:
future dangerousness is often cited as an aggravating factor in death penalty
cases,374 as it was in Williams v. New York.375 Thus, even the death penalty,
often seen as the apotheosis of retributive punishments,3 76 has a public
safety component. Punishments for felony murder, too, are often justified
on a theory that an offender deserves blame for unintentional homicides-
sometimes even those committed by non-confederate third parties-on an
assumption of the risk theory.37 7 The behavior is so risky that the defendant
deserves to be punished for the actual, if unintentional, consequences of his
actions.
Returning to a case discussed in this Article, the sex offender
registration requirements in Doe were linked to the seriousness of the
372. See, e.g., Pagotto v. State, 127 Md. App. 271, 277 (1999) (discussing the line between
depraved-heart murder and involuntary manslaughter).
373. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES PART II § 210.2 cmt. 4 (1980).
374. See, e.g., Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How "Future Dangerousness"
Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It
Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 147 (2008). As Meghan Shapiro notes:
[W]hile an inquiry into a defendant's future dangerousness seems to align with a
Supreme-Court-approved purpose of capital punishment ("the incapacitation of
dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may
otherwise commit in the future"), in application the incapacitation rationale is
severely undermined by alarmingly unreliable predictions of future threat. Of
even graver concern should be the effect of future dangerousness to obscure any
culpability determination, resulting in a high number of death sentences for
vulnerable defendants most people would never consider "deserving of
execution," and undercutting another common rationale for capital punishment:
retribution.
See also John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue", 86
CORNELL L. REv. 397 (2000-2001).
375. 337 U.S. 241, 244-45 (1949) (holding that when a judge "consider[s] information about the
convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities" during
sentencing, it does not violate due process).
376. One author has argued that a recent Supreme Court decision requiring the condemned to be
competent depends on the retributive meaning conveyed by the act. See Dan Markel, Executing
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future ofthe Eighth Amendment, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1163 (2009).
377. See Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1924
(1986).
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offense, not to the current risk the registrant posed.7 In other words, Doe
was regulated on the basis of what he had done, not what he was at risk of
doing. Offense level-which one might associate with the moral
"seriousness" of the crime-often stands in for risk, even though, of course,
the heinousness of a prior crime is not necessarily an indicator of present
danger. 379  Desert and risk are also tied together in pre-trial release
decisions. Bail amounts cannot possibly be punitive, because they are set
for offenders who have only been charged, not convicted, of a crime.
Instead, bail-in theory-serves to ensure that the individual will appear in
court, or, if no bail is given, to quarantine dangerous offenders to protect
the community. While both of these goals are justified on morally neutral,
risk-based terms, bail is commonly set (or denied) not on the individual
risks posed by a particular offender, but on a uniform schedule that looks
only at the offense charged. 38 0  That is, offense level is used to measure
risk, mixing the seriousness of the offense-what we might associate with
its blameworthiness-with the risk the offender poses.
Evidence of prior criminal activity is obviously one indicator of
risk. "Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as
persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made in a
civil-commitment proceeding."38' The issue is how to account for both risk
management and punishment in criminal law, and to determine whether
these issues have different constitutional implications. Indeterminate
sentences like California's fifteen years-to-life sentence, I have
suggested,382 should be read to explicitly represent both concerns. "Fifteen
years" covers what the offender deserves. The subsequent decision the
parole board makes to release him or keep him up "to life" should be read
as the risk management portion of the sentence.383 The point is that our
understanding of what criminal penalties do is muddled: we should
approach risk management and punishment differently.
The indeterminacy of these issues might mean that the legislature
should do most of the work here, and that at least some deference is due to
their decisions. We do not want to enshrine a judicial view of social
science or risk prediction any more than we want to make "Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics" part of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 84  But the
378. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
379. Decisions about suitability for parole in California relied, until very recently, almost
exclusively on the gravity of the offense, not contemporary evidence of dangerousness. Ball, supra note
11, at 915-18.
380. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1296b(c) (West 2010) (mandating superior court judges in
each California county to establish and annually revise a county-wide uniform schedule of bail for all
bailable felony and misdemeanor offenses).
381. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983).
382. Ball, supra note I1, at 935-39.
383. Id. at 938.
384. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, what seems
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fact remains that risk is an issue in the criminal law, and one that existed
before the writing of this Article. Criminal law says that danger melds into
opprobrium some of the time, and that opprobrium can be a proxy for
risk.8 The question is what, if anything, we should do about these hybrid
doctrines. Is there a way of cutting them more finely?
Justice Scalia has, in this context and others, been opposed to
standards.386 In the Apprendi context he lampooned such standards as
being prone to self-serving decisions: standards involve a judge ruling that
a practice "must not exceed the judicial estimation of the proper role of the
judge."3 87  In Seling he argued further that an as-applied challenge would
leave the law unsettled, and that in the name of finality the Court needs to
concern itself only with the law on its face. 8 Justice Scalia's concern
seems to be the potential for abuse-that standards are always somehow
more manipulable than bright-line rules.3 89
It is unclear, however, that rules are always self-evident: courts
hear cases about rules all the time. The issues rules cover-and their
importance-are arguably what drives litigation, not whether a rule or a
standard per se governs the issue. Defendants appeal decisions because
they have important issues at stake. Though rules are more easily stated,
they are not necessarily more easily implemented. Parties argue both about
to be the criminological state of the art in one era can seem like barbarism in another. See, e.g., Ethan
Blue, The Strange Career of Leo Stanley: Remaking Manhood and Medicine at San Quentin State
Penitentiary, 1913-1951, 78 PAC. HIST. REV. 210 (2009) (describing San Quentin chief surgeon Leo
Stanley's endocrinological theory of crime, which led him, inter alia, to take the testicles of the executed
and implant them in elderly inmates).
385. Recently, the Court discussed the issue of risk and harm in Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1849 (2009), which concerned whether an accidental discharge of a gun during a robbery should be
analyzed according to whether it caused harm or the risk of harm (or a feeling of "trauma" in
bystanders, id. at 1856), or culpability.
386. Of course, the Court has not historically shared Justice Scalia's aversion to standards. See,
e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 524 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice
O'Connor noted in her Apprendi dissent:
We have therefore declined to establish any bright-line rule for making such
judgments and have instead approached each case individually, sifting through
the considerations most relevant to determining whether the legislature has acted
properly within its broad power to define crimes and their punishments or
instead has sought to evade the constitutional requirements associated with the
characterization of a fact as an offense element.
387. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 307 (2004).
388. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 269-70 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note
71 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) ("Whether the Sixth Amendment
incorporates this manipulable standard rather than Apprendi's bright-line rule depends on the
plausibility of the claim that the Framers would have left definition of the scope of jury power up to
judges' intuitive sense of how far is too far."). For a critical view of Justice Scalia's preference for
bright-line rules, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 474 ("[T]he Court's quest
for a bright-line rule has produced not certainty, but confusion and absurdity. And in the end, the Court
has been forced to answer the boundary question anyway, but its answer ... is logically ridiculous and
pragmatically counterproductive.").
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the borders of the rules and the standards one should use in implementing
them. When courts suggest that there are no standards underlying rules-as
is the case with Justice Scalia's mechanical version of Apprendi-courts
might arguably see even more litigation, because parties cannot easily
discern the borders of a rule that has no underlying formula describing it.
In any case, Justice Scalia is, in fact, wedded to a case which
grounds its holding in due process: In re Winship. The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof has no foundation in the text of the Constitution
(much less the text of the Sixth Amendment). He cannot abandon due
process without abandoning one of the two prongs of the Apprendi rule. He
deploys the rule in a mechanical way, but the standard of proof holding
from Winship was and always will be, at its core, about "fundamental
fairness." 390 Ironically, then, the best safeguard against abuse might be the
Due Process Clause itselfW91-a prospect that, admittedly, would be cold
comfort to Justice Scalia.3 9 2
My goal in raising these issues is not to grind discussion to a
hopeless, white-flag-waving halt, but to suggest that judicial, legislative,
and civic thinking about the meaning of criminal and civil penalties has a
long way to go. Statutes, judicial decisions, and the impulses of ordinary
citizens have not clearly delineated what criminal punishments mean-what
we are doing and why. I doubt we will find a single answer to the problem,
but we can be more explicit about the goals of criminal punishments, how
these goals are served in particular circumstances, and what protections a
defendant is due.
C. The Endogeneity Problem: The Interdependence of Civil and Criminal
Penalties
There is one final problem with stigma to discuss: endogeneity.
Stigma comes not only from a criminal conviction, but from the collateral
(civil) consequences that attach to that conviction. Once someone gets out
of prison and off parole, the stigma of conviction has not left them: their
criminal record follows them around.393 The length and breadth of the
stigma of criminal convictions, in other words, comes in part from the civil
disabilities an ex-con faces upon re-entry.
Because the process by which stigma is created, reinforced, and
390. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
391. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 345 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
392. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
393. Applying the Link/Phelan factors to SVP laws, for example, a state affixes a label (SVP)
with negative stereotypes (SVP's cannot control their behavior, even though the identified mental defect
does not have to be empirically linked), separation from "us" (residency restrictions as in Jessica's law),
status loss, and discrimination. See supra notes 208-214 and accompanying text. The state has both soft
and hard power, and sex offenders have no political power. With the Internet recording the registry and
making it freely available to all who search, the status is both long-lasting and notorious.
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expanded is so complex, we might know both that stigma exists and how it
creates secondary deviance but nevertheless not know the exact
mechanisms by which it is created-and therefore how it should best be
regulated. Having suggested that stigma is important, I must acknowledge
that the interrelationships between criminal and collateral/civil penalties
make it unclear whether stigmatization is primarily a civil problem, a
criminal problem, or some combination of the two. Justice Scalia's
approach, despite its failure to take into account the nuances of each
situation, succeeds on one level: it gives us a clear decision-making rule. If
figuring out the just result-or the accurate result-is impossible, perhaps
we should at least seek to maximize utility by making judges' lives easier.
Stigma might leave us with more questions than answers.
For example, if the jury is really imposing stigma when it convicts,
it is told nothing about collateral sanctions at the time of conviction. (To be
fair, most of the time, juries are also not told anything about the criminal
sanctions an offender will face upon conviction.3 94) Alternatively, the
length of a criminal sentence imposed is going to be a significant part of the
stigma imposed under the Link/Phelan framework, since physical isolation
in prison isolates and renders powerless all those inside. Thus, on some
level, part of stigma collapses into Justice Scalia's "pure time" analysis.
And even though the use of criminal history in the civil context is
nonpunitive when it is used to determine who must register as a sex
offender, cases considering the use of criminal history in a criminal context
to calculate aggravated sentences hold that the use of criminal history is
punitive.395
The temptation is to avoid the issue, to point out that these
problems have been exposed by this Article, not generated by them. After
all, this Article did not introduce the concept of stigma to criminal law,
Apprendi and other cases did. This Article merely tries to give an account
of stigma. Perhaps the only contribution I am making here is to identify
where the fault lines are about risk and desert.
But perhaps the real source of the problem is that retribution is
impossible to theorize in a way that we all agree with.396 We acknowledge
that retribution-punishment-is at the heart of the criminal law, but we
394. In a recent article, Jeffrey Bellin has proposed that juries be informed of the consequences of
conviction. See Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of
the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B. U. L. REv. 2223 (2010).
395. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998) (recidivism "goes to
the punishment" (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. 1783, 1789
(2008) (explaining that recidivism bears on both seriousness of offense and public safety). For an in-
depth discussion of this issue, see Ball, supra note I1, at 929-30.
396. Recent research suggests that our sense of a statute's "criminality" follows from our moral
feelings about it, whether or not we are consciously aware of them. In other words, moral concerns
determine whether we think of a law as criminal, not the other way around. See Kevin M. Carlsmith &
John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice in Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, in 40 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 193-236 (M.P. Zanna ed. 2008).
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cannot find ways of agreeing on what it means. Desert is axiomatic; 97 we
have all this retribution and nowhere to put it.39 8 So rather than make an a
priori case for the necessity or value of punishment, one way to read
Apprendi is that it delegates that which cannot be proven. Most defendants
will admit their guilt and accept their punishment via a plea bargain.3 99 As
long as we are going to punish those defendants who do not admit guilt, we
should let the jury do it. Punishment cannot be fully captured by utilitarian
calculations or policy analysis: so as long as it's a question about what feels
just in the individual case, with all the systemic uncertainty that entails, we
should let the jury sort it out.4 00 The jury is a black box best equipped to
deal with the black box issue of the appropriate level of punishment.40 1
Judges aren't going to be able to explain or reason their way around
punishment, because punishment isn't about reason: "[T]he emotions are in
fact in charge of the temple of morality, and . . . moral reasoning is really
just a servant masquerading as the high priest.AO2 Juries aren't going to be
397. See Michael H. Marcus, Conversations on Evidence-Based Sentencing, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM.
JUSTICE 61, 71 (2009) ("Because we have allowed 'just deserts' to remain unspecified, vague, and
elastic, it offers all participants in the process-including policy makers, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges-wholesale exemption from any accountability for accomplishing any public purpose.
Because we genuflect to such ultimately useless proclamations as 'the purpose of sentencing is
punishment,' we achieve quite a catalog of exemptions from responsibility for serving public safety or
public values.").
398. For a fascinating argument that acknowledging retribution might be a way of preserving
rehabilitative interests, see Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model Penal
Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (noting that the "furies of revenge" must
be "paid deference" since they are "entrenched in the general population and cannot be ignored"
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 396, at 218.
As Carlsmith and Darley note:
[I]f legal codes differ markedly from citizens' moral intuitions, then the legal
system needs to . . . persuade them of the moral correctness of the court-held
laws. Otherwise citizens will not agree with the criminal codes ... and .. . this
will have negative consequences for their willingness to voluntarily obey the
law.
Wechsler's critique is less clearly operational in the contemporary context, at least when it comes to the
passage of the Three Strikes law in California. See Guest Post: The Uses of Revenge, Redux,
SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (June 3, 2009, 8:52 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw
and policy/2009/06/guest-post-the-uses-of-revenge-redux.html#comments.
399. See Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining,
84 TEx. L. REv. 2023, 2036 (2006) (noting that, in the federal system, over 97% of defendants waive
their right to a trial and plead guilty).
400. Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 396, at 194 ("[T]he formal U.S. justice system is becoming
increasingly utilitarian in nature, but . . . citizen intuitions about justice continue to track retributive
principles.").
401. Id. at 207 (reviewing experimental psychology literature to conclude that "people do not
have a good sense of their own motives for punishment").
402. Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCE 852, 852 (R. J.
Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith eds., 2003). Haidt here is talking of research beyond just
his own, but he later cites his own research for the proposition that "the emotions [are] firmly in control
of the temple of morality, while reason is demoted to the status of not-so-humble servant" which people
use primarily "to persuade others, not to figure things out for themselves." Id at 866. See generally
JONAH LEHRER, How WE DECIDE (2009).
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able to explain or reason their way through their decisions, they're just
going to work it out.
In sum, issues about public safety are reasonable: we can argue
about whether someone is going to be dangerous or not and about what we
might do to make them less dangerous. We might even be able to prove the
rectitude of our position. But we cannot really resolve questions about the
appropriateness of a given level of punishment. As long as we have a cross
section of the community hashing it out, making sure beyond a reasonable
doubt that they agree, then we have provided as much protection as we
possibly can.403
Conclusion
In this work and in my prior article4 0 4 I have tried to tease out the
principles and approaches Apprendi uses and to indicate how they might
apply to a new context. I do not see Apprendi as mindless or mechanical,
but that position means that the ramifications take a while to sort out. This
is an evolving issue, and my point has been not necessarily to suggest
where the new bright lines should be but to point out areas that need closer
examination.
It is not clear what the impacts might be if the civil commitment
process became "Apprendized." Under the Sixth-Amendment-only
reading, Apprendi would change little about current practices. Kevin
Carlsmith, John Monahan, and Alison Evans have done a compelling
survey of jurors that suggests that retribution is actually at the heart of jury
decisions about civil commitments.4 05 This study has two ramifications.
403. In arguing that the Apprendi jury right gives us a place to put retribution, I do not claim that
juries are skilled at retribution, just that they are not as bad at it as other institutions are. Or, more
cynically, maybe the reason we have the jury decide about punishment is because they are not as bad at
morality as they are at other things. See, e.g., Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 396, at 205 ("[Pleople
spontaneously punish in a manner that is highly consistent with a theory of retributive justice and not in
a manner consistent with the utilitarian goals of incapacitation."). So we take this concept that is often
discussed, but seldom analyzed (maybe because it can't really be analyzed), and we marry it to a rough,
randomizing procedure that we can't ever really predict (the jury ofone's peers), and we are satisfied (or
satisficed) because we can't possibly do any better than that. The amoebic nature of the jury and the
amoebic nature of punishment match perfectly with one another. All we have is anyone's best guess.
This is perhaps one reason why courts only hear cases or controversies-we cannot make rules, we can
only hash out what is right in an individual case using principles derived from cases that are always
different in some colorable particulars. The principles to be derived from these cases, in turn, match
imperfectly onto the next series of cases and controversies. Ironically, though, this puts me back to a
Scalian view of criminal procedure: that it is about mechanisms, not the kind of fairness those
mechanisms provide. See supra note 200.
404. Ball, supra note 11.
405. Kevin M. Carlsmith, John Monahan, & Alison Evans, The Function of Punishment in the
"Civil" Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 437, 439 (2007) (noting that
"recent empirical work has demonstrated that although people frequently articulate incapacitative
motivations in sentencing criminal offenders, their behavior is more consistent with the retributive
perspective"). All participants were presented with a vignette describing the offender's criminal history
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One, it might suggest that Justice Scalia's mechanical view might be
justified-jurors punish even when they say they aren't. At the same time,
it suggests that the jury might not serve any limiting factor-their appetite
for punishment is unbounded.406
A unified due process approach might do nothing more than remind
all players in the system that there isn't "criminal" liberty and "civil"
liberty, there is just liberty. The civil and criminal subcategories really
have to do with different effects on the same thing, not different effects on
two different things. Taking a more holistic view of liberty deprivations,
particularly those that result from the same kinds of behavior (e.g., sexual
predation), can lend coherence to how we approach the problem. Focusing
on the due process aspects of the Apprendi line, then, and imbuing civil
protections with the kind of scary absolutism that seemingly takes hold
whenever Apprendi is invoked might mean that judges and prosecutors take
these protections more seriously.
Theoretical concerns aside, few would disagree that no matter how
one describes stigma, sex offenders are stigmatized: they commit as close to
a permanent and unforgivable offense as we have today.40 7 Is there any
way of imposing restrictions on sex offenders that isn't inherently punitive,
given the stigma associated with them? Or is this merely a reason why
courts should examine nominally civil restrictions more closely-because
the politics around the issue are so unbelievably punitive? Consider how
much these laws even reflect the real dangers about sex offenders. SVP
laws must include some proof of mental defect, but the largest study of
which described his conviction on two counts of child molestation. Id. at 440. From here, different
participants were given different proxies for risk and punishment. Participants were given one of thee
estimates of the offender's likelihood of recidivism (zero, four, or seventy percent). Id. Participants
were also given two different accounts of the offender's time in prison: a low punishment account,
where the offender served "3 years in a comfortable minimum-security prison with full access to sports,
movies, libraries, and visitors," and the high punishment account, where the offender served "25 years
in a harsh, maximum security prison" in which he was alternately violently assaulted and confined to
solitary. Id. at 441. "[W]hen the punishment was insufficient, people paid less attention to the
likelihood of recidivism and uniformly expressed their desire to incarcerate the prisoner." Id. at 444.
When punishment was adequate, recidivism "became more relevant." Id.
406. The current situation isn't much better, however: The use of factors related to future conduct
is much less constrained in the civil commitment context than it is in the criminal context. See John
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and
Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 395 (2006). Ultimately, the levels of protection aren't necessarily
controlling here. This Article looks at why we have the rules we have, not necessarily how to game the
rules to achieve the right policy outcomes.
407. "Regular"-that is, non sex-offending-criminal offenders, while stigmatized, can enjoy
some post-release "civil" rehabilitation, for example by "expunging" their records in order to relieve
themselves of the obligation to disclose prior convictions on employment applications. Some have
suggested that formalizing these expungements (or holding "graduation ceremonies") has important
benefits, which speaks to the social power of criminal stigma. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in JUSTICE AS A BASIC HUMAN NEED 64-65 (Anthony J.W. Taylor ed., 2006) (citing
studies which suggest that "redemption rituals," such as graduation ceremonies following the successful
completion of a criminal sentence, are effective at confirming the authenticity of a person's reform and
therefore at preventing recidivism).
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predictors for future violence concluded that mental illness, by itself, "was
associated with a lower rate of violence than a diagnosis of a personality or
adjustment disorder."408 Even if the evidence showed a relationship
between mental defects and higher rates of sexual violence,4 09 consider how
few resources are deployed towards treatment.410 Though this
consideration might impinge on legislative deference, it certainly suggests
that legislators are less interested in minimizing threats to public safety than
in scoring political points.
Although this paper has focused on post-release issues related to
sex offenders, the analysis applies to a wider range of subjects where public
safety and retribution are intermingled. 4 11 Pre-trial detention is based on
dangerousness and threats to public safety-but the primary evidence of
that danger is the charge against the detainee,4 12 and the case which
established the constitutionality of the practice, United States v. Salerno,
relied heavily on the stated civil intent of the authorizing statute. 413 What
about restrictions short of confinement-voting restrictions, for example?
These aren't punishments, but they do restrict liberty, and many are
stigmatic. In Trop v. Dulles,14 in many ways the precursor to Mendoza-
408. The MacArthur Violence Risk Assesment Study: Executive Summary, MACARTHUR
RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (Apr. 2001),
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html. However, "[a] co-occurring diagnosis of substance abuse
was strongly predictive of violence." Id Violence in the study included sexual assaults. Id.
409. See, e.g., JAMI KRUEGER, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF PROB. AND CORR. ALT., RESEARCH
BULLETIN: SEX OFFENDER POPULATIONS, RECIDIVISM AND ACTUARIAL ASSESSMENT 2, 4 (2007),
available at http://dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/somgmtbulletinmay2007.pdf (noting differences in recidivism
between sex offenders and the general offender population; among the factors particularly important in
assessing sex offender risk include prior sexual offenses, age at first sexual offense, diversity of victims,
and measures of antisocial personality, but not "general psychological problems such as anxiety and
depression"). But see Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross- Validation and Extension of the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232
(1997) (noting that "there is considerable evidence that some factors predict all crime, whether violent
or non-violent, sexual or nonsexual, trivial or serious," although psychopathy is important for both
rapists and child molesters). For a basic treatment of why psychopathy and mental illness are not
synonymous, see John Seabrook, Suffering Souls: The Search for the Roots of Psychopathy, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 10, 2008, at 64.
410. In California, for example, the state prison system has no programs for incarcerated sex
offenders. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE: A
ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE OFFENDER PROGRAMMING IN CALIFORNIA 35 (2007), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/docs/ExpertPanelRptPartl.pdf
411. The Supreme Court has recently held that effective assistance of counsel includes advising
one's client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473
(2010). For a general criticism of the collateral consequences rule and its conflict with the ethical duty
to give accurate advice, see Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions, Silence and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119
(2009). For a proposed legislative response to this problem, see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2009), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2009am approved.pdf.
412. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-43 (1987).
413. Id. at 747.
414. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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Martinez, Chief Justice Warren wrote that denationalization was punitive
because it meant the individual had "lost the right to have rights.A15 It was
"a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development."416
Trop deserted the army on the field of battle, but did not lose his
membership in society as a result. Is depriving ex-felons of the right to
have rights-of participation in society's political, employment, and
housing activities-any different?417
The extent of the legislature's power depends, in some ways, on not
being second-guessed by the judiciary. At the same time, constitutional
protections are meaningful only if the legislature can't label its way out of
them. Unifying the approach courts use for civil and criminal statutes
would be more consistent and sensible than dividing functionalism
according to form. In so doing, courts should embrace the ways in which
retributive and utilitarian concerns overlap and are potentially present no
matter whether we're talking about civil statutes, criminal statutes, or public
safety punishments. Apprendi, it turns out, has something of a specious
clarity to it, one that comes only if one jettisons its very real due process
concerns and remakes the doctrine into a creature of the Sixth Amendment.
But this Apprendi loses something-the advantage of flexibility in dealing
with situations where differences are, in many ways, more a question of
degree than of type.
Apprendi, ultimately, is not an entirely new doctrine whose
application to novel situations should be avoided for fear of unintended
consequences. It's a collection of older doctrines. The Court already
knows how to deal with due process-it should not shy away from due
process analysis with an Apprendi label slapped on it.
415. Id at 102.
416. Id at 101.
417. See Christopher Uggen et. al, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of
Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 281, 283 (2006). As a recent article
notes:
The barriers to full polity membership faced by convicted felons are substantial
and wide ranging, although they are usually ignored in public debates. A
dizzying array of informal barriers also impedes the performance of citizenship
duties, in particular those related to employment, education, and reestablishing
family and community ties. As we will see, the civil penalties imposed with a
criminal conviction effectively deny felons the full rights of citizenship. This
denial, in turn, makes performing the duties of citizenship difficult.
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Appendix: Overview of State SVP Confinement Laws
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Appendix Key
* Presumably. Not Explicitly Stated.
** Mental Health Board
Inferred
**** Various types of Judges
Standard of Proof ("Standard")
BRD-Burden on state, beyond a reasonable doubt
CC-Burden on state, clear and convincing evidence
U-Unclear






SSOB-State Sexual Offenders Board




Right to Counsel ("Counsel")
AC-Appointed Counsel
N-No
















Burden of Proof for Release ("Release")
BRD-Burden on state, beyond a reasonable doubt
CC-Burden on state, clear and convincing evidence
P/P-Burden on prisoner, preponderance of the evidence
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